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Thediscussion in this Part follows closely the text of Occasional Paper 17,
Product, War and Prewar' (National Bureau of Economic Research,
Feb. 1944). Changes have been made to take account of the more recent esti-
mates of the Department of Commerce, and to bring the series through the
last two quarters of 1943.
For a critical review of the Occasional Paper and a discussion of the meth-
ods used see Review of Economic Statistics, Vol. XXVI,No.3, August 1944,
pp. 109-35.
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As defined in Part I, national product in wartime is the sum of fin-
ished output: (a) flow of goods to ultimate consumers; (b) addi-
tions to the stock of nonwar capital; (c) flow of goods to war
uses; (d) additions to the stock of war capital. Components (a)
and (b) constitute nonwar output, the nonwar sector; components
(c) and (d), war output, the war sector. National product is net
or gross as components (b) and (d) are measured net or gross of
the current consumption of durable capital.
The estimates in Table 111 are merely approximations to national
product so defined because the data are not sufficiently detailed to
measure accurately final product categories. The following com-
ments serve to indicate the respects in which the estimates fail to
give what is wanted.
The value of goods flowing to, or retained from their production
by households and individuals (line 1) excludes subsistence and
related expenditures by the government for the armed forces. The-
oretically, it should include them, since it should measure all goods
flowing to consumers qua consumers. There is no more reason to
exclude the value of subsistence for the armed services from the
flow of consumer goods (as a measure of a distinct category of
final products) because it is covered in war output than to exclude
expenditures on consumer goods by workers in munitions plants.
The subsistence item under war output, together with pay, is the
value of services rendered by the military forces; and there is no
duplication if the goods are treated also as part of the flow of goods
to ultimate consumers.
This item is not easy to measure. It should include only the part
of the allowance for food, clothing, shelter, etc. that is a minimum
needed by the armed forces as peacetime consumers; not the part
that represents special needs arising from the particular demands
of military activity. Yet to say what part of total expenditures on
food, clothing, shelter, transportation, etc.for the armed forces
is equivalent to a peacetime consumption minimum and what part
is due to special military needs is difficult. It may be argued that
since the value of the services of the armed forces is determined
arbitrarily, a simpler. method would be to equate it to money pay-
ments alone, thereby allowing in war output for the flow of con-
sumer goods to members of the armed forces qua ultimate consum-
ers. But this would seriously undervalue the services of the armed36 PARTII
forces, calling for a subsequent correction, and mis-classify under
war output a portion of the flow of goods to consumers. It was
deemed preferable to characterize the omission as a qualification
upon our estimates of the flow of consumer goods. Could this item
be included, both the flow of goods to consumers and national
product in a year like 1942 would be $2 to $3 billion larger than the
totals in Table IIi'
TABLE II 1
National Product, Wartime Concept, Current Prices
1939-1943
(billions of dollars)
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943
1Flow of goods to consumers64.8 68.8 77.7 85.1 94.1
2 Nonwar capital formation
a) Gross 13.2 16.7 20.9 8.8 2.7
b) Net 6.0 9.3 13.0 0.1—6.5
3 War output
a) Gross 1.4 2.8 12.8 50.3 81.3
b) Net 1.4 2.8 12.5 49.5 79.5
4 National product
a) Gross (1 + 2a + 3a)79.4 88.3111.4144.2178.1
b) Net (1 +2b+3b) 72.2 80.9103.2134.7167.1
For derivation see Appendix II and Appendix Table II 11. Since these estimates use
the recent work of the Department of Commerce, the coverage of the components is not
the same as that in National Bureau estimates. The two chief differences are (a)
of goods to consumers excludes imputed rent on owner-occupied houses; (b) net pri-
vate capital formation, the major part of total nonwar capital formation, is the residual
left after subtracting depreciation and depletion as recorded in business accounts, i.e.,
unadjusted to current reproduction value. Also, viewed as sums of income payments
and undistributed savings of enterprises, the totals implicitly disregard government
savings, i.e., set them at zero.
The value of services to individuals by governments in peacetime
is assumed, somewhat arbitrarily, to be equal to direct personal
taxes paid by individuals. There is no reason to modify the assump-
tion in wartime: at least prewar direct tax payments may be inter-
preted as compensation for services by governments to individuals,
and only the increase in direct taxes attributed to the additional
1Ifwe assume minimum subsistence to be $500 per member of the armed forces, and
4 million in the armed forces in 1942, the item amounts to $2 billion. It would tend
to rise rapidly from 1941 to 1943, accentuating the rise shown in Table II1.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 37
servicesrendered in war. For this reason, prewar direct taxes are
added to round out consumers' expenditures to total outlay.2
Before we can estimate nonwar capital formation (line 2) we have
to differentiate war from nonwar capital goods. Some part of the
addition to privately financed equipment and construction was, dur-
ing the years covered in Table 111, specifically designed for the
production of war implements or their components; and a substan-
tial proportion of both private and public nonwar capital forma-
tion, while not directly assciated with munitions production, was
due to the expansion of activity associated with the war. In a sense,
all capital formation in a period of intensive preparation for or
participation in a major war is for military purposes, stimulated in
the short run by war needs.
Yet the classification cannot be based upon purposes—for they
are intangible. It should rather take into account the extent to which
equipment and construction are either of such physical character as
to be suitable only for war production in the narrowest sense or of
such extraordinary size as can be warranted by war demands alone
and in no way be justified by reasonable estimates of peacetime
needs. As this cannot be done with the present data, the best prac-
ticable criterion is the source of financing. Additions to capital
equipment that are specifically for transient war needs and are so
unwarranted by peacetime prospects as to require government financ-
ing could be defined as capital formation for war purposes. Private
financing or government financing outside the war budget was con-
sidered evidence that the capital formation involved could be defined
as nonwar in the longer run.
War output in line 3 differs from the usual estimate of war ex-
penditures in excluding payments that do not represent a draft upon
real resources (property purchase, prepayments, and the like); and
in line 3b, in excluding also depreciation on government-financed war
construction and equipment. Neither adjustment can be statistically
precise.
2Itmay be argued that a more reasonable method would be to allow for an increase
in direct taxes associated with the rising cost per unit of governmental services. This
correction, however, would be for a relatively small part of the total, arid would call
for a subsequent adjustment of the totals in current prices by a price index for gov-
ernmental services. In calculating totals in 1939prices,direct taxes were held constant
at the 1939pricelevel, the assumption being that the real volume of services to
consumers did not change.38 PARTII
Another disadvantage of the estimates in line 3 is that part of
war output is measured before it reaches the units that dispose of it
for purposes of the armed conflict. Even in the series for munitions,
products accepted by the military agencies and ready for combat or
training use are combined with products subject to further modifi-
cation. While there is no duplication, war output is not as truly a
finished products total as the flow of consumer goods.3
The above qualifications stem from a single cause: the available
information is on categories of outlay by source, a not unambiguous
guide to the categories of final products. Yet the disparities between
what we wish and can measure are not sufficient to preclude analysis.
Table II 1 reveals marked changes in national product and in its
composition: a striking increase in the total in current prices from
1939 to 1943;aspectacular climb of war output to high proportions
of national product; an increase in nonwar capital formation until
194 1, then a drastic contraction; an impressive increase in consumers'
expenditures, retarded after 1941.
However, there is little purpose in analyzing here the estimates
in current prices. Our interest is in real output and the relative pro-
portions of its components measured in real terms; and for this
purpose Table II 1 may be quite misleading. Even in peacetime,
values in current prices tend to disguise movements in real output
and contain some elements of noncomparability in the price struc-
ture and in the price fluctuations of national product components.
But in peacetime these elements of noncomparability and hetero-
geneity are few because price changes and shifts are usually not
violent. In wartime, however, prices tend to fluctuate violently and
bases of valuation for the war and nonwar sectors of the economy
are inherently noncomparable. Estimates in current prices are then
merely a first step toward estimates of national product and its
components in real terms. The next step is obviously to measure
price changes and differentials.
2PRICE CHANGES AND DIFFERENTIALS: THE PROBLEM
The national product totals given above are sums of final products,
each valued at changing price levels and on bases possibly differ-
8Onthe other hand, additions to inventories held by the government on war account
and not yet paid for are omitted. To this extent, the total understates the increase in
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ent from one component to another. To make these totals internally
consistent and unaffected by temporal changes in prices we need in-
dexes designed to adjust values in current prices for both price
changes and differentials.
We assume first that the valuation base current in recent prewar
years for nonwar goods is appropriate for estimating national
product in real terms comparable as between war- and peacetime.
The alternative would be to accept the valuation base for the war
sector in wartime and try to modify the base for the nonwar sectors;
in other words, to value each component of national product just
as war goods are valued. Obviously it would be difficult to translate
all components of national product to the unusual and rapidly
shifting valuation b.ase that determines the pricing of war goods.
Even if it were not, national product totals covering both peace-
and wartime would be more comparable and internally consistent if
based on peacetime valuations, foronly are they more persistent
in the longer run but also constitute a more familiar set of values
for appraising changes in wartime.4
If this position is conceded, the task in' the nonwar sector is solely
to find reliable measures of changes in prices over time. Formidable
difficulties arise even here. Price indexes do not reflect fully quali-
tative deterioration in commodities and services; the up'
that takes the form of adding superficial and unwanted elements to
the good, largely in order to raise it into higher price brackets
without violating price regulations; the reduction in discounts or in
services formerly granted in connection with durable commodi-
ties; pricing on black markets; and the general effects of a narrow-
ing freedom of choice on the part of would-be civilian purchasers.
As indicated in Section 3, only a few halting steps can be taken
toward overcoming these difficulties. Still for the nonwar sector we
can construct indexes of final product prices that, when applied to
totals in current prices, yield approximate estimates of the relevant
components of national product at prewar market prices.
The war sector presents more serious difficulties. To begin with.
prices of final products (various items of munitions and of war con-
struction) are not freely accessible; nor are they in existence dur-
ing the full period spanning both prewar and war years, for many
4Withthe conclusion of the war, new nonwar bases may be used, preferably of a
postwar year relatively free from the disturbing effects of war.40 PARTII
of the items were not produced until this country got well into
the war. Even when items produced in 1939-40 and 1942-43 are
superficially similar, e.g., war planes, certain types of guns, and
merchant ships, the qualitative change is such that the resemblance
is more in name than in substance. It is impossible to construct di-
rectly a price index of war products that would span both prewar
and war years.
Even were it possible, price and valuation bases. for the war and
nonwar sectors would still not be comparable; or, following the
preference just indicated, it would still be necessary to adjust prices
of war products to a valuation base comparable with that which
determines prices of peacetime goods on the free markets of the
economy. Commodities. and services for use in the armed conflict
are purchased under conditions radically different from those that
govern transactions in peace type products on the market. Hence,
even if we expressed war output as totals in constant prices of muni-
tions, war construction, and nonmunitions., the valuation of at least
the first two components would be quite different from that of
peacetime goods; and we would be adding into national product
physical quantities multiplied by a heterogeneous set of weights.
It may be argued that the rather lavish use of monetary incentives
and of laws and regulations, which condition the prices of war
products in wartime, represents a shift in consumer preferences
on a par with changes in more normal times; or that it is a mere
quantitative expansion of the area of governmental purchasing and
government-destined production, which in peacetime also is char-
acterized by valuation practices substantially different from those
in private markets. To the first argument one may reply that if
there are such violent and drastic shifts in consumer preference,
estimates of national product cease to have any meaning unless
based on a relatively fixed set of values that consciously ignore
such shifts. A reply to the second argument is that while govern-
ment-bound production and products of the private business sys-
tem are not valued on comparable bases in peacetime, the former
is so small in years of peace that the distortion in the national
product totals is negligible; but that the matter cannot be dismissed
so lightly when the government-controlled sector becomes as large
as it does during a major war.5 At any rate, it seemed better to
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wrestle with the problem than ignore it or reduce it to a question
of temporal changes only in final product prices in the war sector.
We attempt therefore to value war output not at actual 1939
prices (if such could be found), but at prices it would have fetched
in 1939 had it been produced under conditions comparable to peace-
time, i.e., when producers could attain the efficiency of resource
input characteristic of comparable peacetime industries grown to
maturity without the haste and waste of wartime. The concept may
seem 'unrealistic; but it is only so far as any application of peace-
time criteria to wartime is unrealistic. And if we are to have na-
tional product totals continuous and comparable as between prewar
and war years, and some basis for evaluating war output in its
longer range postwar aspect, we cannot avoid introducing arbitrar-
ily a common base.
In this attempt we must begin with evaluation at the resource
input level. At the final products level there is no comparability
between peacetime goods and war implements. The choice between
butter and machine guns is not made in the way consumers'
demand determines the choice between bread and cake; nor is
the government in the position of a producer who chooses among
capital goods according to his knowledge or anticipation of con-
sumers' demand. But resources common to both butter and machine
guns can be identified; and some can be specifically tagged as hav-
ing been used to produce the former in peacetime and the latter
in wartime. It is thus at the resource input level that the first step
can be taken to reduce elements of heterogeneity (at a point of
time) and of noncomparability (over time) in wartime national
product in current prices.
The element of heterogeneity isthis: identical or comparable
resources utilized at a given time for different ends (e.g., civilian
and war goods) are not compensated at the same monetary rates,
but the differences in compensation do not correspond to differences
in the efficiency of use. The elements of noncoinparability (over
time) are two:(i) identical or comparable resources in identical
or comparable uses at two different points of time are not corn-
to be conditioned by rules quite different from those of the private market place, the
problem will remain formidable and will require careful reconsideration of the some-
what arbitrary compromises made in estimating national product forthis country
before this war.42 PARTII
pensatedat the same monetary rates; (ii) identical or comparable
resources shifting over time to different uses (e.g., from peace to
war production) are not compensated at the same monetary rates,
but the differences in compensation do not correspond to differences
in efficiency of use.
Therefore measuring war (and hence total) output in real terms
raises two distinct questions: What changes occur over time in the
monetary compensation of identical or comparable resources? Does
a change from peace to war production mean that identical or
comparable units of productive resources are used more or less
efficiently? The separation of the two elements of noncomparability
is artificial in that the resources that shift to new uses undergo
changes both in monetary compensation per efficiency unit and in
efficiency. But it is easier to measure them separately, and as the
first is obviously much more susceptible of definition and measure-
ment, it is treated first.
The successive steps are:(i) To measure changes over time in
final product prices for consumer goods, nonwar capital formation,
and certain components of war output (nonmunitions) (Sec. 3a).
(ii) To measure changes in prices of resources entering the major
part of war output (munitions and war construction)(Sec. 3a).
(iii) To assume changes in the efficiency of resource input in the
nonwar sectors and nonmunitions, then convert the indexes under
(i)to indexes of the compensation of resources, with which we
can translate national product and its components to resource
input at 1939prices(Sec. 3b).(iv) To assume changes in and
the relative levels of the efficiency of resource input in munitions
and war construction, then convert the indexes under (ii) to in-
dexes of the final product prices of munitions and war construc-
tion, i.e., prices on a base identical with peacetime prices of prod-
ucts of comparable industries. Once the price differentials between
peace and war goods have been eliminated, national product and
its components can be translated to a consistent level of final out-
put in 1939 prices (Sec. 3c).NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 43
3PRICE CHANGES AND DIFFERENTIALS: PROCEDURES
AND ASSUMPTIONS
a Price indexes for products and resources
The degree to which price and other data can be made to reflect
quality and quantity changes in the nonwar sector, and differences
in the productivity of resources. between the nonwar and war sec-
tors, determines the degree of our success in measuring national
product and its components in real terms. The procedures are de-
scribed in detail in Appendix II, but the estimates cannot be under-
stood without some introduction here.
To test the adequacy of the price indexes used by the Depart-
ment of Commerce to translate consumers' outlay into constant
prices, we compared movements in 'deflated' totals with changes
in output destined for civilian use. This test, applied to food prod-
ucts and apparel (clothing and shoes), seemed to warrant a sub-
stantial correction for the understatement of the price indexes (for
this particular purpose). In all other commodity groups and for
some sectors of the service group, the price data customarily used,
'which are commonly acknowledged toreflect inadequately the
types of price change briefly indicated in the opening paragraphs
of Section 2, could not be adjusted. Consequently, even our over-
all price indexes for the flow of goods to consumers may under-
state the price rise; if so, the price adjusted totals overstate the in-
crease or understate the decline in the 'real' value of the flow of
goods to consumers.6
Since the Department of Commerce price indexes for nonwar
capital formation represent the most practicably complete utiliza-
tion of available data on the prices of final products, they were used.
Here too restrictions and smaller supply have led to quality de-
OAnadjustment made in Occasional Paper 17tore-weight the various price indexes
for services has now been carried through by the Department of Commerce, and we
have used their recent price indexes for this category.
No great accuracy is claimed for the correction made in the price indexes for
food and clothing. Indeed it may well overstate the price rise in these two categories.
But if so, the overstatement may serve to offset the downward bias in the price indexes
for the other commodity and service groups. And the price measures wanted here—
indexes of changes in costs of commodities and services to all consumers, reflecting
shiftsintheir residence and employment statusas wellasthefull complex of
changes in the quality of goods—are quite different from such measures as the BLS
cost of living index, which reflects changes only in the prices paid by a settled group
of wage earners and low-salaried employees.44 PART II
terioration, reduction of discounts and services customary in more
normal times, and a narrowing of the would-be buyer's choice.
There is, therefore, ground for assuming that the indexes under-
state the price rise, and that, consequently, the totals adjusted for
price changes overstate values in constant prices.
Under war output and and war con-
struction' were estimated separately. The former comprise mili-
tary pay and subsistence allowances; salaries of civilians in war
agencies; subsistence outlays as well as travel for the armed forces;
agricultural exports to allies; and similar miscellaneous items. The
price indexes for the commodity items were based on Bureau of
Labor Statistics wholesale price data; for the pay items, on known
changes in rates of pay. Though rather crude, they contain no per-
ceptible biases.
and war construction' are dominated by items of
specific use in the armed conflict and subject to the rapid quali-
tative changes associated with active warfare—planes, guns, am-
munition, naval ships, merchant ships, war construction units (bar-
racks, depots, airfields, etc., government-financed war plants and
war housing). The price indexes, based on the compensation of re-
sources rather than on the prices of final products, were built up
from separate indexes for the three resource categories: labor costs;.
gross profits, allocable between returns to capital and enterprise;
and corporate income and excess profits taxes. The weights assigned.
to these three resource cost indexes (the price adjustment was.
made separately for the three subtotals, each representing the rele-
vant cost category) were based on the division of the gross value
product in the five industries (metal mining, oil and gas mm-
ing, metals fabrication, chemicals and petroleum refining in
facturing, and contract construction) that accounted for the bulk
of munitions output and war construction in 1942 and 1943.
The price measure for the labor factor is an index of hourly
earnings in 44 war manufacturing industries weighted by current
year man hours. The total current cost of the capital and enterprise
factor was calculated by multiplying the total value of munitions;
and war construction by the changing ratio of the combined total
of corporate net income after taxes, depreciation, entrepreneurial
income, interest, and net rents and royalties to the gross value
product of the five industries. The corresponding price meas-NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 45
ure was obtained by dividing an index (1939=100) of the total
value of these items in the five industries by an index of the
consumption of raw materials of mineral origin. The latter, pre-
pared by G. H. Moore, was taken to measure changes in the physi-
cal volume of capital and enterprise input. Finally, it was assumed
that the corporate taxes (income and excess profits) paid in 1939
were the monetary equivalent of the government's contribution to
business activity, and that, after 1939, such services increased with
real output, i.e., with deflated labor, capital, and enterprise costs.
Accordingly, the deflated totals of labor, capital, and enterprise
costs were multiplied by the ratio of 1939 taxes in the five in-
dustries to the 1939 total of such costs; the result measures gov-
ernmental services (at 1939 prices) rendered in connection with
these activities.
Of course the assumptions adopted to construct price indexes for
the various categories of resources embodied in munitions and war
construction can easily be challenged. Attempts to attach quanti-
ties to processes whose substantive scope is exceedingly difficult to
ascertain, the indexes are submitted here in the realization that fuller
data may make better estimates possible in the future. But crude
as the indexes are as measures of changes in compensation per re-
source unit entering munitions and war construction, the implicit
assumptions are, on the whole, in the direction of under- rather
than overstating the rise in resource prices. For both labor and the
human part of capital and enterprise the procedure assumes that
the groups involved are comparable through the years. with respect
to skill and training. But this means that the price indexes neglect
the dilution of skill and experience in labor and managerial groups.7
Furthermore, for both labor and nonlabor factors, the procedure
assumes that in each industry covered, compensation of factors en-
gaged in war production has increased since 1939 at the same rate
as compensation of factors engaged in the same industry in all
work. That is, the indexes neglect the possibly greater increase by
1942 or 1943 in the pay to factors engaged in war production proper
7Thereis an offsetting factor in the undervaluation of the services of the armed forces
and war agency personnel included under nonmunitions. The relative magnitudes
cannot be gauged; but there is some doubt that the underpayment of the armed forces
and war agency personnel relative to their potential earnings is equal to or greater
than the overpayment of labor or management in war production relative to their
skills and training by prewar standards.46 PART II
than in the compensation of factors still engaged in the same in-
dustries in peace type work.
True, there are offsets that might reduce the downward bias of
the price indexes. The index of earnings per man hour covers wage
earners in selected industries that by 1942 may have been engaged
chiefly in war work. It is quite possible that price per unit of input
of other labor entering war outlay (salaries in war industries, pay-
ments to employees in transportation or other fields serving the war
but not covered in our index) may have risen less from 1939 to
1942 than earnings per man hour in the 44 manufacturing indus-
tries.Similarly, compensation of nonlabor factors, entering war
output but not covered in our indexes, may have risen less than is
indicated. However, a rough balancing of these considerations,
which can be nothing but a guess, would suggest that the offsets
would not fully cancel the downward bias of the price indexes.
Consequently, like the price indexes for other components of na-
tional product, and perhaps to an even greater degree, the indexes
of compensation of productive factors entering war output may
understate the price rise between 1939 and 1943.
Prices of goods to consumers rose more in 1942 and 1943 ac-
cording to the index in Table II 2, line 1, than according to the
customary cost of living index (line 5). As indicated in Appendix
II, Section 1, some of the difference may be due to an improperly
full imputation of our adjustments in food and clothing to the price
indexes. Perhaps some should be attributed to a bias in the current
price totals. But the greater proportion is due to the emphasis in
TABLE II 2
Final Product and Resource Price Indexes
National Product Components, 1939-1943
1939 =100
PriceIndexes for 19391940194119421943
1Flow of goods to consumers (exci. gov. services)100 101 107 122 134
2 Nonwar construction & equipment, gross 100 101 107 116 123
3 War output, gross 100 112 128 144 160
4 Wholesale prices, BLS 100 102 113 128 134
5 Cost of living, BLS 100 101106 117 124
The indexes in lines 1-3 are implicit: totals in current prices divided by the correspond-
ing totals in 1939 prices. For a detailed description of the procedures and the quarterly
and annual totals see Appendix II.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 47
theBLS index on measuring price changes of a relatively constant
bundle of goods going to a settled body of wage earning and low-
salaried families. The indexes appropriate for the 'deflation' of
consumers' outlay should reflect also the effects of migration; qual-
ity deterioration, even though not compensable by larger money
outlay; and changes in the cost of living of consumer groups other
than those covered by the BLS index.
The rise in prices of resources entering war output was relatively
sharp (line 3). Since the index covers also prices (at the final
product level) of nonmunitions, which rose less, the rate of com-
pensation of resources associated with munitions and war construc-
tion proper rose even more than is indicated in line 3.
Table II 2 brings us to an intermediate stage in the analysis. The
indexes in lines 1 and 2 (and part of that in line 3) are for prices
of final products; those dominating the entries in line 3, for prices
of resources. Were we to apply these indexes in adjusting the rele-
vant components of national product, one part of the latter would
represent a sum of final products at their 1939 prices; the other, a
sum of productive resources at their 1939 prices. The two parts can
legitimately be added only by one of two further steps: (1) esti-
mate changes in the efficiency of resources in the area outside muni-
tions and war construction, then convert the final product price
indexes into measures of changes in the compensation of resources
at their 1939 efficiency level; in which case the national product
totals, when adjusted for price changes, become consistent measures
of the 'real' value of resource input at a constant efficiency level;
or (2) estimate changes after 1939 in the efficiency of resources put
into munitions and war construction; then convert the totals for
munitions and war construction into measures of final output, com-
parable with the other components of national product.
b Conversion to resource prices
The few scattered data on the efficiency of resources in the nonwar
sector (chiefly in some manufacturing and mining industries and
utilities on a per man hour base) suggest that the rise since 1939
has been moderate, at an annual rate of not more than 2 or 3 per
cent; that it virtually ceased by 1942; and that in recent quarters,
as the scale of operations in many civilian industries shrank and48 PARTII
dilutionof labor and other resources took place, efficiency per re-
source unit may have declined slightly.
On the basis of such meager evidence, a quarterly efficiency index
was constructed and applied uniformly to the price indexes (at
final product prices) for three of the chief components of national
product (flow of consumer goods, excluding direct taxes; nonwar
construction and equipment; the nonmunitions part of war output).
The price indexes for final products were thereby converted into
price indexes for resources in terms of their efficiency in 1939.8
Evenif this single efficiency index is accurate, its application to
such different groups of final products as are represented by con-
sumers' outlay, nonwar construction and equipment, and nonmuni-
tions is arbitrary. Efficiency of resources put into construction and
equipment may have risen less or more than efficiency of resources
in the production, transportation, and distribution of consumer
goods; and it may well be asked how productivity of resources in
such a heterogeneous category as can be gauged.
But it seemed preferable to make the assumption, on whatever little
ground could be found, then show how the customary measures
have to be modified, if only to stress the questions that must be
answered in any consistent estimate of national output or input in
real terms.
Comparison of the indexes in Tables II 2and3 reveals relatively
minor differences, largely because the scanty data indicate merely
minor changes in the efficiency of resources embodied in the flow
of goods to consumers and other components aside from muni-
tions and war construction.
Since changes in the prices of all components are measured on
the same base in Table II 3, price indexes implicit in national prod-
uct canbe derived (lines 4 and 5).9 These are indexes of resource
8 See Appendix Tables II 2, 3, and 6. Actually, totals by final product price
indexes were adjusted.
The efficiency index for the nonwar sector (see App. Table II2, cot. 3) shows
only a minor decline from the latter part of 1941 to 1942; and no change from 1942
to 1943. It is quite possible that the index is biased in failing to reflect a decline in
efficiency of resource use in nonwar industries in the latter part of 1942 and in 1943.
Unfortunately there is no evidence upon which to estimate such a decline. If the index
is indeed faulty in this respect, resource input (at 1939 prices) in the nonwar sector
would be understated in 1942 and 1943.
O This istrue with the exception of governmental services to individuals(direct
taxes), which are included at the same absolute level in both the current price andNATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 49
TABLE II 3
Resource Price Indexes
National Product and Its Components, 1939-1943
1939 =100
PriceIndexEcforResourcesEmbodied in 19391940194119421943
i Flow of goods to consumers (exci. gov. services)100 104 112 128 140
2 Nonwar construction & equipment3 gross 100 104 112 122129
.3 War output, gross 100 112 129 147 162
-4 Gross national product 100 104 114 133149
.5Net national product 100 104 114 136 153
Allindexesare implicit: totals in current pricesdivided by thecorresponding totals
in1939 resource prices.
prices, -that is, strictly speaking, the totals to which they apply are
of national resource input, not of final output.'°
The notable features of these indexes are their rise to relatively
high levels by 1943 and the acceleration of the rise after 1941. In
the two years 1939-41 they rise only 14 per cent; in the following
two years over 30 per cent, partly because of a fairly steep rise from
1941 to 1943 in resource prices of war output, partly because of the
large increase in the weight of war output in national product.
cConversion to final product prices
The main question here concerns the relative efficiency of resources
used in munitions and war construction. The sole evidence is scat-
tered information on changes in labor efficiency in some munitions
industries (planes, merchant ships), which indicates a marked rise.
•There are no data that would serve even to suggest the relative
efficiency of resources in munitions and war construction compared
with that in similar(i.e., five industries in 1939—except
2gain fragmentary data on loss of labor time paid for due to labor
difficulties of attaining a smooth flow of materials and
components, and troubles arising from rapid modifications in tech-
nical specifications due to fluid conditions of active warfare.
Consequently, assumptions had to be made again. The estimates
adjustedtotals. The item, however,isrelatively small, and of slight effect on the
implicit price indexes.
10 Not the full total of all resource input, since resources devoted to unproductive
activities(e.g., robbery or forbidden drug peddling) are presumably excluded. The
total embraces only resource input in uses not explicitly recognized by society as
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arrived at by resort to them, of illustrative value, lead us to con-
clusions that are no more than tentative and inferential. The three
assumptions in the calculation differed in the relative efficiency
assigned to resource input for the first half of 1943. Assumption a
set the level of efficiency in munitions and war construction at 80;
forthe other components of national product, at 105. This meant
that whatever the efficiency ratio of resources in the five
industries to resources in all industries was in 1939, the cor-
responding ratio in the first half of 1943 was lower by the propor-
tion: (105 —80)105. Assumption b set the relative efficiency
level in munitions and war construction in the first half of
at the efficiency ratio for the five industries in 1939. Assump-
tion c set it higher than the corresponding ratio for the five
industries in 1939, by the proportion: (130— 105) -÷-105.11
In addition to assuming different levels of relative efficiency in
munitions and war construction in the first half of 1943, we assume
that they moved similarly between 1939 and the recent quarters,
namely: (i) that efficiency increased two-thirds from 1939 to the
first half of 1943, then another tenth in the second half of that
year; (ii) that the increase was fairly steady through 1941; (iii)
that in the last quarter of 1941, and especially in the first and second
quarters of 1942, the upward trend was damped by the precipitous
expansion of munitions and war construction; (iv) that efficiency
rose rapidly after the second quarter of 1942 as plants were com-
pleted, mass production of munitions began to hit its stride, and
the pains of rapid growth subsided; (v) that in the second half
11 The assumptions indicate nothing concerning the efficiency of resources in munitions
and war construction, on the one hand, and in all other production, on the other.
They relate directly to the ratio between two ratios:(i) the ratio in 1939 between
efliciency in the fivewar' industries and in the other sectors of national product;
(ii)the ratio between efficiency in munitions and war construction in 1943 and
efficiency in the other sectors of national product.
Assumption a states that the ratio of (ii) to (i)is 0.76 (i.e., (80 ÷ 105) :1)
assumption b,thatit is 1.0(i.e., (105 ÷ 105):1); assumption c,thatit is 1.24
(i.e., (130 ÷ 105): 1).
However, the assumptions imply a relation between the efficiency of resources in
munitions and war construction in 1943 and in the fiveware industries in 1939:
under assumption a, the former is at a level of 0.8 of the latter; under assumption b,of
1.05; under assumption c,of1.3.
The reference throughout is to the first half of 1943, the most recent period covered
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of 1943 the rate of increase began to decline, reflecting the begin-
ning of cutbacks in some of the older programs..'2
Upon these assumptions, we convert the indexes of resource prices
for munitions and war construction into indexes of final product
prices, the prices being on the bases at which comparable products
were valued in a prewar year like 1939 (Table II 4, line 3). Since
these indexes are consistent with those for the flow of consumer
goods and nonwar capital formation, indexes of price changes in
national product also can be calculated (Table II 4, lines 4 and 5)
Of course, the price indexes for war output are not in terms of
1939 as 100: they would yield 100 for 1939 only if the efficiency
of resource use in war production were assumed to stand in the
same relation to efficiency in the other sectors of production as
characterized the five industries at their 1939 productivity
level. In other words, the base of the indexes is not the actual prices
of war products in 1939, but what those prices would have been
if the efficiency of resource use in munitions and war construction
had been the same as in the five twar' industries in 1939. The
amount by which the entries in lines 3a, b, and c exceed 100 in
1939 measures the extent to which the relative efficiency of re-
sources in war production was assumed to fall short of that in com-
parable industries in 1939.
If we wish to measure temporal price changes alone, i.e., not
correct for any differences in the way prices, measure real output in
the war sector as compared with the nonwar, lines 3a, b, and c can
be converted to relatives of 1939 and the results averaged (line 6).
This price index rises moderately to 1942, then declines in 1943.
12 The assumed movement in the relative efficiency of resource use, as distinct from
the level assumed for the first half of 1943, is based for the years since 1941 upon a
rough check with the expansion in munitions output weighted by constant prices. The
three assumptions concerning the relative efficiency level in the first half of 1943 are
illustrative; and the preference, in subsequent discussion, for assumption a is based
largely upon scattered evidence of lavish (by peacetime standards) use of manpower
and materials in war production.
There is no inconsistency in assuming a rapid rise in the relative efficiency of
resource use in munitions an:d war construction and a low level compared with the
efficiency in the fivewar' industries in 1939. A rapid rise could hardly be expected
from levels of efficiency in 1939 that would be close to those in comparable indus-
tries which have enjoyed a long history of rising volumes and cumulative improvements
in technology of operation. Yet this in itself is no proof that levels of relative efficiency
of resource use in munitions and war construction by 1943 were necessarily lower
than those of comparable industries in 1939.52 PARTir
Differences among the various price indexes in Table II 4 are as
might be expected. If we allow for the lower efficiency of resource
use in war production than in the comparable prewar industries, and
thus for a higher price level in it, the very increase in the propor-
tion of war output in national .product causes an upward movement
in the price indexes for national product as a -whole. For example,
under assumption a the over-all price index rises more than 50 per
cent from 1939 to 1943 (lines 4a and 5a). The failure to allow for
TABLE II 4
Final Product Price Indexes
Three Assumptions concerning the Relative Efficiency of Resource Use
in Munitions and War Construction, 1939-1943
Price Indexes for 19391940194119421943
1Flow of goods to consumers (exci. gov. services)100 101 107 122 134
2 Nonwar construction & equipment, gross 100 101 107 116 123
3 War output, gross
a) Assumption a 165 175 187 189 182
b)Assumption b 138 144 156 158 148
c) Assumption c 119 123 133 133 126
4 National income
a) Assumption a 101 103 113 142 156
b) Assumption b 101 102 111 134 143
c) Assumption c 100 102 110 127 131
5Gross national product
a) Assumption a 101 103 112 139 152
b) Assumptionb 101 102 111 132 140
c) Assumption c 100 102 109 125 130
6 War output, disregarding level of relative effi-
ciency inwar production 100 104 113 114108
7 National income (based on lines 1,2, 6) 100 101 108120 121
8 Gross national product (based on lines 1, 2, 6)100 101 108119 121
9 Gross national product, Dept. of Commerce
adjustment & concept 100 101 106 115 120
LINE
I & 2 Table II 2.
3a, b, c See Appendix II.
4 & 5 Totals in current prices divided by the corresponding totals in 1939 prices
(App. Tables 1111-14).
6 Arithmetic mean of relatives of lines 3a, b, and c (1939100).
7 &8Totals in current prices (App. Table 1111) divided by the price adjusted totals
(adjusted by lines 1, 2, and 6). -
9Survey of Current Business, April 1944, p. 6, Table 1. The concept includes
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the lower efficiency of resources in war output yields an over-all
price index that rises only 19 or 20 per cent from 1939 to 1942, and
in 1943 rises 1-2 per cent further (lines 7 and 8).
In its adjustment for price changes the Department of Commerce
assumes that final prices of munitions do not change over time, and
that they are comparable with prices in the nonwar sectors (line 9).
This is tantamount to saying that a war output price index is af-
fected solely by changes in the prices and relative weight of non-
munitions, and, in the Department's calculations, also by the changes
in the construction costs indexes used to tdeflate' war construction.
The resulting price index is similar to an index that measures only
temporal changes in the prices of war output and does not allow
for the lower level of relative efficiency of resource use. Line 9 differs
from line 8 only in that it is somewhat lower in 1941, 1942, and
1943, and rises slightly more from 1942 to 1943.
4 NATIONAL PRODUCT IN CONSTANT PRICES
a The several variants
With the alternative price indexes discussed in Section 3, national
product and its components at constant price levels in several vari-
ants are computed (Table II 5). The meaning of each variant must
be understood before the differences in its movement over time, in
its distribution among its main components, and in the increases
and declines in it and its components can be analyzed.
The variants in lines 1 are sums of resources valued at their 1939
prices. Line I1, for example, is the sum of productive resources,
weighted at their 1939 prices, i.e., at their 1939 efficiency as repre-
sented by the prices they fetched in that year, embodied in the flow
of goods to consumers. A similar statement, with modifications in
the description of the categories of final products into which the
resources entered, can be made for lines II 1, III 1, IV 1, and V 1.
The four variants in lines 2 differ in the degree to which they
allow, in the transition from the resource to the final product level
of measuring munitions and war construction, for differences in the
relative efficiency of resource use. Variants a, b, and c assume that
resource use in munitions and war construction is at an efficiency
level, relative to the rest of the economy, different from that charac-
terizing similar types of industrial output (i.e., largely the metal54 PART II
working, chemical, and construction industries) in 1939. Variant
ddisregardssuch differences in efficiency level betwen munitions and
war construction and its prewar civilian counterpart in 1939, and
adjusts the value in current prices only for temporal changes in the
final product prices of war goods.
The 2a lines are, then, the sums of final products weighted by
their 1939 prices, on the assumption that in converting resource
input in munitions and war construction into final products, the
efficiency of use, relative to the rest of the economy, was in 1939 at
0.48 of the relative efficiency level of comparable peacetime indus-
tries (metal mining and manufacturing, chemicals and construc-
TABLE H 5
NationalProduct and Resource Input, Wartime Concept, 1939-1943
1939 Final Product and Resource Prices
(billions of dollars)
19391940194119421943
IFlow of goods to consumers
1 Resource input 64.866.469.566.667.1
2 Final product 64.868.0 72.769.870.3
II Nonwar capital formation, gross
1 Resource input 13.2 16.1 18.7 7.2 2.1
2 Final product 13.2 16.5 19.6 7.6 2.2
Ill War output, gross
1 Resource input 1.4 2.5 9.9 34.3 50.2
2 Final product
a) Assumption a 0.8 1.6 6.9 26.544.6
b) Assumption b 1.0 1.9 8.2 31.9 54.8
c) Assumption c 1.1 2.3 9.637.864.8
d) Disregarding level of relative
efficiency in war production 1.4 2.7 11.344.1 75.3
IV Net national product
1 Resource input 72.277.690.299.1109.3
2 Final product
a) Using III 2a, net 71.678.791.394.9107.0
b) Using III 2b, net 71.879.092.6100.3117.2
c) Using III 2c, net 71.979.494.0106.2127.2
d) Using III 2d, net 72.279.895.7112.5137.7
V Gross national product
1 Resource input 79.485.0 98.1108.1119.4
2 Final product
a) Using III 2a 78.8 86.1 99.2103.9117.1
b) Using III 2b 79.086.4100.5109.31273
c)UsingIII 2c 79.1 86.8101.9115.2137.3
d) Using III 2d 79.487.2103.6121.5147.8
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tion) and rose to 0.88 by the last quarter of 1943. The same state-
ment could be repeated for lines 2b and c, with changes in the ratios
to 0.63 and 1.18, and '0.78 and 1.46 respectively.13
The 2d lines are quite different: also the sums of final products
weighted by their 1939 prices, they do not allow, in the conversion
of resource input in munitions and war construction into final prod-
ucts, for any difference in level of efficiency, between these indus-
tries and comparable peacetime industries, relative to the rest of
the economy. They do reflect, however, the large upward movement
in the efficiency of resource use in munitions and war construction.
The distinction between the estimates at resource and at final
product levels is clear; and which is chosen depends primarily on
the uses to which they are to be put. Similarly, the choice between
the final product totals that do (a, b, c) and do not (d) allow for
differences in levels of relative efficiency between war and peace-
time production of comparable character is also clear; for any pur-
poses in which national product, in real terms, for prewar and war
years is to be compared and in which the proportion of war and
other output is to be established in final product terms, variants of
the a-c type alone are suitable.
But the choice among the three variants based on different as-
sumptions concerning the relative efficiency of resources in muni-
tions and war production is not easy; for it is determined by differ-
ences in the validity of assumptions concerning a phenomenon ex-
tremely difficult to observe at all accurately—not by theoretical
criteria. As already indicated, preference for one of these three
variants (or any of this type using different levels of relative effi-
ciency of war production) cannot be grounded upon much tangible
evidence and is largely a matter of judgment.
As far as national product and its distribution by final product
cate.gories are concerned, the choice among variants a, b, and c (and
perhaps any others of similar character that may reasonably be de-
vised) is of quantitative importance for 1942 and 1943 alone. Be-
fore 1942 war output, no matter how measured, was too small a
proportion of national product for differences in its price adjust-
ment to have much effect. Even in 1942 the spread among national
product totals in the three variants is only somewhat over 10 per
13 Under the assumptions concerning both relative levels and movement discussed in
Section 3c.56 PARTII
cent. Not until 1943dothe quantitative effects of the choice among
the three variants become decisive.
We definitely prefer variant a, with its assumption that resource
use in war production in the first half of 1943wasstill below com-
parable prewar industries in relative efficiency. The efficiency we
are concerned with is that in munitions and war construction in
1943 as compared with similar peacetime industries of 1939, not
as compared with it in munitions and war construction in 1942,
1941, or 1939, or that of resources in 'other' industries in 1943 or
any earlier year. The judgment is solely that the efficiency of re-
sources in munitions and war construction in the first half of 1943
was some 20 per cent lower than that of resource use in comparable
prewar industries in 1939. In other words, utilization of labor
(measured, e.g., by idle hours out of the total paid for or by di-
version to less essential jobs to fill gaps); of materials (measured,
e.g., by rates of consumption compared with those at more mature
stages of technology); of machinery (measured at input rates per
unit, not at time rates, compared again with the practices of the
older and gradually developing industries of peacetime) was, in
the first half of 1943, still below the prewar par.
This statement should not be interpreted as an adverse verdict
upon this country's enterprise or as depreciation of its enormous
accomplishment after it entered the war. On the contrary, to be able
to assume that relative efficiency in war production was no more
than one-fifth less than that of comparable peacetime industries
is a matter for congratulation when we think of the pressure to
turn out munitions in huge quantities, the rapidly changing demands
of warfare, and the drains upon manpower and management by
calls into the military services. But just as it would be unfair to
minimize the gigantic productive task met, so would it be mislead-
ing to ignore the patent fact that resources were not used as eco-
nomically as they might have been had the more efficient methods
feasible with slower growth under more normal competitive con-
ditions been possible. Regardless of the validity of the specific figure
used in assumption a (which should perhaps be somewhat larger
or smaller), we believe that assigning to war production a lower
level of relative efficiency in the first half of 1943 than existed in
similar industries before the war is decidedly more justifiable than
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b Increase, 1939-1943
We discuss only the two estimates that seem preferable: resource
input or national product at final product prices under assumption a.
National product, both gross and net, is roughly 50 per cent
greater in 1943thanin 1939 (Table II 6, col. 6). Of this increase,
somewhat more than half occurred before this country entered the
war (col. 1and5). The percentage increase in national product
during the two years of participation is somewhat less than that
during the two years of neutrality.
The increases in the Department of Commerce totals and in such
TABLE II 6
National Product and Resource Input, Wartime Concept.
Percentage Increase, Selected Peridds
1939 Prices, Several Variants
1939-1941- 1939- 1942- 1941- 1939-
194119421942194319431943
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)
I Net national product
1 Resource input 24.99.937.310.321.251.4
2 Final product
a) Regarding relative efficiency in
war production, assumption a* 27.5 3.932.512.817.249.4
d) Disregarding level of relative
efficiency in war production 32.517.655.822.443.990.7
II Gross national product
1 Resource input 23.610.236.110.521.750.4
2 Final product
a) Regarding relative efficiency in
war production, assumption a* 25.94.731.912.718.048.6
d) Disregarding level of relative
efficiency in war production 30.517.353.021.642.786.1
III Other measures
1 Dept. of Commerce G.N.P., 1939 prices
a) Dept. of Commerce concept 26.718.149.717.138.375.3
b) Adj. to our concept 31.720.158.218.342.187.2
2 FRB industrial production index 48.622.882.620.147.5119.3
*Net national product
b) Assumption b 29.08.339.716.826.663.2
c) Assumption c 30.713.047.719.835.376.9
Gross national product
b) Assumption b 27.2 8.838.416.526.761.1
c) Assumption c 28.813.145.619.234.773.6
Entries under I and II based on Table II 5. Entries under III based on Department of
Commerce figures and the Federal Reserve Board index (revised as of Oct. 1943).58 PARTII
widely used measures of industrial output as the Federal Reserve
Board index are larger. Gross national product, based upon the De-
partment of Commerce concept and price adjustment, rises 75 per
cent; and the percentage rise from 1941 to 1943 is much greater
than from 1939 to 1941. Readjusted to our concept (to exclude
prewar business taxes), it rises 87 per cent from 1939 to 1943; and
again the percentage rise after 1941 is much greater than dur-
ing the preceding two years. The Federal Reserve Board index,
which would naturally rise more since it is more heavily weighted
by industrial commodity production, rises 119 per cent from 1939
to 1943; the percentage rise from 1941 to 1943 is about the
same as from 1939 to1941. The difference between our esti-
mates and those of the Department of Commerce is due largely
to a different treatment of the value of war output; that between
our estimates and the Federal Reserve Board index is due partly to
a difference in coverage and partly to a different treatment of the
productivity of factors in the war industries.14
The rates of increase in our national product totals at resource or
at final product prices are in themselves not unusual. In the two
decades for which annual estimates are available, 1919-38, there
are increases of relatively the same size. From 1921 to 1923 net
national product in 1929 prices rose 25 per cent and gross national
product (wartime concept) 22 per cent; from 1935 to 1937, 24
and 22 per cent. These increases compare with a 25-27 per cent
increase from 1939 to 1941; and with an increase of either 17 or
22 per cent from 1941 to 1943. From 1933 to 1937 net national
product in constant prices increased 49 per cent and gross national
product 43 per cent, which compares with roughly 50 per cent from
1939 to 1943. From 1933 to 1936 the former increased 38 per cent,
the latter 33 per cent, compared with 33 and 32 per cent from 1939
to 1942.15
14TheFRB index is based, for recent years, upon man hour input in many war indus-
tries, weighted by productivity levels extrapolated from 1939. No allowance is made
for possibly lower efficiency levels in the war industries relatively to those of com-
parable industries in 1939.
15Allfigures for national income and for gross national product 19 19-38 are from
estimates recently revised for National Product since 1869. The comparison should
properly be confined to the variant at final product prices, since the national income
figures have been adjusted for price changes with the help of final product price
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These numerical comparisons disregard the phase of the business
cycle the initial years represent. Each period selected from the two
decades 1919-38 begins with a year of deep depression, either 1921
or 1933, with the sole exception of 1935-37, and even by 1935
cyclical expansion had fallen short of the preceding cyclical peak
in total output (as measured by national income in constant prices).
Under such conditions national product in real terms may easily rise
by substantial percentages within a fairly short period. In contrast,
1939 was not a year of depression: the level of activity, again as
measured by national income or gross national product in constant
prices, was much higher than in the preceding peak year in the busi-
ness cycle, 1937. This consideration, together with the probable
continuation of the rise that began in 1938 through 1944, and the
bias of the comparison against the present period because of the
more careful adjustment for price differentials and changes that
tend to overvalue product in any expansion, leads to the conclusion
that the present period of sustained and marked rise in the real value
of national product, which has already lasted six years, is an achieve-
ment unique in our economy in recent decades.
However, other factors must be taken into account. First, even
though 1939 was a year of more than full recovery from the cyclical
depression of 1938, the levels of national product in constant prices
do not compare favorably with 1929; and as indicated more fully
in Part III, there are many evidences that more resources could
have been put to use. A substantial part of the subsequent rise was
facilitated by this slack, which greatly exceeded that in the 1920's.
Second, even disregarding the whole question of the ultimate net
difference in movement between resource input and final product levels would not
be sizable.
It may be argued that the comparison is improper, since in any cyclical expansion
the proportion of national product accounted for by the less efficient new industries
(similar to munitions and war Construction) may increase; and a procedure like that
used here to put final products on a comparable valuation basis would tend to accel-
erate the rise of the price indexes, thereby retarding the rise in the price adjusted
totals. No such price adjustment was applied to the estimates for 1919-38.
The validity of this argument depends upon the correctness of the assumption that
there isa substantial rise during cyclical expansions in the proportion of national
product accounted for by the less efficient industries (beyond the rising secular
trend in their share). It is to be doubted that such an increase even approximates the
degree to which the share of war output increased iii 1942 and 1943, at least for areas
in peacetime economy so new and so far below comparable industries in relative
efficiency as were munitions and war construction.PART II
contribution of war output to future social welfare, between 1939
and 1944, as in any cyclical expansion, resources shifted from the
nonmarket to the market area; such a shift, as always, meant a re-
duction in the flow from the nonmarket area of goods of a type
rarely taken account of in measuring national product. Yet the re-
duction in the supply of these nonmarket goods (largely services
of housewives and other members of the family) must have been
much greater during this recent period than during the prewar cycli-
cal expansions; and the offsets to the rise in the volume of goods
turned out by the market sector must have been all the greater.
Perhaps as our data improve, further research will succeed in
measuring the nonmarket sectors of the economy (in addition to
such few items as are now covered, e.g., products retained by farmers
and imputed rent); and thus lead to a more comprehensive measure
of the total flow of final product. This more comprehensive measure
would undoubtedly show a smaller relative rise from 1939 to 1943
than the present estimates.'°
c Share of war output
The changing ratio of war output to national product is of par-
ticular interest in wartime as an indicator of the proportion of re-
sources or final products devoted to war. As a measure of the full
impact of the war upon the national economy, it has serious limi-
tations: it disregards the effect of the war upon the capital structure
of the country, while its meaning in terms of effects upon the wel-
fare of the inhabitants is obviously contingent upon the level of
national product per capita, the rate at which civilian supply per
capita declines, and the distribution of consumer goods. However,
it is a rough approximation to what is wanted; and in view of its
16Theanalysis of the estimates we present could, perhaps, have been made more
pointed had we attempted to measure the rise in national product in relation to the
underlying long term trend instead of from a given year. However, the establish-
ment of such a trend is beset with difficulties; and its values at the end of the long
period to which the trend line would have to be fitted would be subject to especially
wide margins of error.
Another refinement of the estimates in Table II 6 (and in Tables II 7 and 8)
is to base them on quarterly rather than annual totals. These quarterly estimates,
presented in Appendix II, can be used in calculations that span the full period and
distinguish between the quarters before and after Pearl Harbor. Since they are approxi-
mate and their margin of error wider, it did not seem necessary to go beyond the
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widecurrent usage, its movement is established on the basis of our
estimates.
The share of war output increased rapidly from 1939 to the first
half of 1943—from 1 or 2 per cent to a percentage ranging from
38 to 45; also, as would be expected, most sharply from 1941 to
1942 (Table II 7). The Department of Commerce estimates are
similar. Only when we apply its method of price adjustment to our
concept does the share in 1942 and 1943 greatly exceed that meas-
ured here at the resource level. The difference is not more, partly
because our adjustment corrects the prices of both consumer goods
and war output for upward biases.
The difference between the share of war output for 1942 in final
product prices (variant a) and the Department's is greater. Indeed,
the outstanding feature of Table II 7 is the difference for all years
TABLE II 7
War Output as a Percentage of National Product, Wartime Concept,
1939-1943
1939 Prices, Several Variants
19391940194119421943
I Netnational product
1 Resource input 1.9 3.210.633.8 44.5
2 Final product
a) Regarding relative efficiency in
war production, assumption a* 1.1 2.0 7.2 27.140.2
d) Disregarding levelof relative
el&iency in war production 1.9 3.4 11.5 38.5 53.5
II Gross national product
1 Resource input 1.8 2.9 10.1 31.742.0
2 Final product
a) Regarding relative efficiency in
war production, assumption 1.0 1.9 7.0 25.5 38.1
d) Disregarding level of relative
efficiency in war production 1.8 3.1 10.9 36.3 50.9
III Other measures
1 Dept. of Commerce G.N.P., 1939 prices
a) Dept. of Commerce concept 1.6 2.8 10.934.846.7
b) Adj. to our concept 1.8 3.1 11.7 36.748.8
*Net national product
b) Assumption b 1.4 2.4 8.5 31.045.4
c) Assumption c 1.5 2.9 9.9 34.8
Gross national product
b) Assumption b 1.3 2.2 8.2 29.243.0
c) Assumption c 1.42.6 9.432.847.2
See source notes to Table II 6.62 PARTII
betweenthe shares at the resource and final product levels (lines 1
and 2a). In terms of resource input, war output accounts for a
larger share of the national total than when it is adjusted for the
relative efficiency of resource use and expressed in terms of final
product. This difference is natural since we assume that, owing to
a lower efficiency of resource use in war production, the quantity of
final war products turned out was less than that resulting in peace-
time from the same input of resources in comparable industries. The
difference had narrowed materially by 1943, and if efficiency con-
tinues to improve, may vanish, or perhaps even change sign.
d Source ot increase in war output
The output of commodities and services for the armed conflict can
be augmented by shifting resources from civilian to war production,
by increasing the total resources put into active use, and by both
methods. Comparison of the increase in war output with the changes
in the nonwar components of national product and in national
product itself in current prices indicates the financial sources of
war output, but not the resource or final product balance. To show
how misleading totals in current prices can be as measures of re-
sources or final products in periods of rapid differential price shifts,
they, together with the totals and components in constant resource
or product prices are given in Table II 8.
From 1939 to 1941 the several variants of national product and
its components in constant prices are roughly similar (Table II 8,
Part A). There isa substantialincreaseinnational product
and in each of itsthree chief components—war output, flow
of consumer goods, and nonwar capital formation (private gross
capital formation plus nonwar government outlay in the Depart-
ment of Commerce total). The increase in war output is a fraction
of the total increase in national product—in all variants less than a
half, and ranging in general from one-fourth to somewhat over
two-fifths. Even the totals in current prices are fairly similar,
largely because prices rose little.
The picture from 1941 to 1943 is quite different (Table II 8,
Part B). In general, war output climbs precipitously—in every
variant appreciably more than national product. The other com-
ponents decline markedly, particularly nonwar capital formation

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of government, although the decline in it is minor). But the several
variants differ in the degree to which the increase in war output
in each is associated with the increase in national product or with
the declines in the nonwar components. Estimates based on our
concept, at both resource and final product levels (variant a), indi-
cate that one-half (or somewhat less) is due to the increase in na-
tional product, the other half to the decline in nonwar capital for-
mation and the very minor drop in the flow of consumer goods.
In the Department of Commerce estimates, whether based upon
its own concept or adjusted to our concept, the increase in national
product amounts to over 70 per cent of the increase in war output.
The decline in the other components, i.e., chiefly in private gross
capital formation, amounts to less than one-third of the increase in
war output; the rest is accounted for by a minor rise in the flow of
consumer goods.'7
The picture is even more strikingly different when we assume
that the içicrease in war output is associated with the increase in
national product in current prices. In this case, well over 90 per
cent of the increase in war output is accounted for by the increase
in national product, and' only 3 to 5 per cent by the net reduction
in the nonwar components combined. Obviously the impression that
the tremendous increase in war output has been attained to such a
preponderant extent by an increase in national product and to such
a minor extent by drafts upon nonwar output—an impression that
can all too easily be formed on the basis of current prices—is far
from the truth, if the analysis of national product in real terms,
as suggested by the upper part of Table II 8, is at all valid.
5 SUMMARY
a)Changes in prices over time and differentials in pricing bases
between the nonwar and war sectors are large during a major war.
Consequently, estimates of national product and its components in
current prices are misleading as indexes of movements in it and in
the shares of its components in 'real' terms, i.e., as physical vol-
17'Inthis calculation the full increase in national product is counted as a source
of the increase in war output. The results would be practically the same were we to
subtract the increase in the flow of consumer goods from the increase in national
product, and treat the remainder alone as a source of augmented war output.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 65
umes weighted by prices constant over time and consistent as to
base.
b)In translating totals in current into totals in constant prices, both
changes in prices over time and the differences in pricing bases be-
tween war and nonwar output must be taken into account. Only
thus can a continued series of comparable estimates., spanning both
prewar and war years, be made.
c)Such an adjustment is attempted here on two levels. First, in-
dexes, based on 1939, of resource prices were computed for 1939
to 1943. Their application to totals in current prices yielded esti-
mates of resource input, total and for the main components of
final product; resources being weighted at 1939 prices, i.e., at their
1939 relative efficiency levels. Second, with the help of assumptions
concerning the relative efficiency of resource use in munitions and
war construction,all indexes were converted into measures of
changes in the prices of final products. Their application to totals
in current prices yielded estimates of final product, total and for
the main components, weighted by their 1939 prices (war goods
priced on a base comparable with that of peace type products).
d)National product adjusted for changes in the prices of resources
(i.e., input of resources at their 1939 efficiency and price levels) in-
creased about 50 per cent from 1939 to 1943. In terms of final
product and on the most plausible assumption concerning the rela-
tive efficiency of resource use in munitions and war construction, it
increased somewhat less. Both increases are appreciably less than
those in the Department of Commerce gross national product totals
in 1939 prices. Estimates based on the Department's concept and
price adjustments increase 75 per cent; those based on our concept
but using the Department's price adjustments, 87 per cent.
e) An increase in either gross or net national product, in constant
prices, of about 50 per cent during four years can be matched in
peacetime (e.g., from 1933 to 1937). The recent increase is un-
usual in that it came not after a deep cyclical trough but after 1939,
which cannot be described as a year of depression, for its levels of
over-all output were above those of the immediately preceding
cyclical peak (1937).
f)Both the resource input and the preferred final product esti-
mates increase from 1941 to 1943 somewhat less than from 1939
to 1941. In contrast, the Department of Commerce estimates of66 PARTII
gross national product in constant prices increase from 1941 to
1943 almost one and a half times more than from 1939 to 1941.
g)In both total resource input and final product, the share of the
war sector rises precipitously—from 1 or 2 per cent in 1939 to
about 40 in 1943; the share of the nonwar sectors declines corre-
spondingly in 1943. Our ratios of war output to national product
at the final output level are lower (38) than those based on De-
partment of Commerce gross national product totals in 1939 prices
(47). In terms of resource input, the share of the war sector in our
estimates (42 per cent) differs less from that in the Department of
Commerce's.
h) From 1939 to 1941 the increase in the volume of resources de-
voted to war production or in the final products represented by it
was merely a fraction (roughly one-third to four-tenths) of the
increase in total resource input or final output. Resource input or
final output represented by the flow of consumer goods and nonwar
capital formation also increased substantially. Totals in current
prices and the Department of Commerce gross national product in
constant prices all show these relations.
i)From 1941 to 1943, in contrast, the increase in the volume of
resources devoted to war production or in the final products rep-
resented by it was much greater than in total resource input or final
output. Our estimates of the national totals of either resource input
or final product rose one-half (or somewhat less) as much as war
output; the compensating changes are a marked decline in nonwar
capital formation and a minor drop in the flow of consumer goods.
Hence at least one-half of the increase in war output was associated
with drafts upon nonwar capital formation and (to a minor extent)
upon the flow of consumer goods.
j)TheDepartment of Commerce totals in constant prices show
a different picture. From 1941 to 1943 the rise in national product
in constant prices accounts for over seven-tenths of the increase in
war output; i.e., less than three-tenths of the increase is accounted
for by a decrease in the nonwar sectors, largely nonwar capital
formation. In other words, our estimates, which tend to tdellate'
war output to terms comparable with nonwar, indicate for 194 1-43
a greater dependence of the increase in the war sector upon contrac-
tion in the nonwar sectors, and relatively less upon the increase in
national product.APPENDIX II
Calculation of Quarterly Estimates in 1939 Prices
1 FLOW OF GOODS TO CONSUMERS
a Final products
The basic data are those of the Department of Commerce on con-
sumers' outlay. To the annual estimates of consumers' outlay in
1.939 prices the prewar total of direct taxes, $3.1 billion, is added.
The Department of Commerce adjustment for price changes
consists largely in reweighting the BLS prices of consumers' com-
modities and services. We attempted to improve the adjustment by
comparing the 'deflated' totals for food and clothing prepared by
the Department of Commerce with measures of the physical volume
of commodity flow. 18
Forabout 75 food items, representing more than 95 per cent by
value of all foods purthased by civilians, the Food Distribution
Administration has estimated the amount flowing into civilian chan-
nels, i.e., after allowance for military takings and net exports. These
items were weighted by consumers' expenditures in 1941. Since no
data are available for 1939 we could not check for an upward bias
in consumers' expenditures from 1939 to 1941. The weighted FDA
estimates were therefore linked to the estimate of deflated expendi-
tures for 1941, giving estimates of expenditures in constant prices
4 and 6 per cent lower than those of the Department of Commerce
for 1942 and 1943, respectively.
It is unlikely that inventory changes can account for any consid-
erable part of these differences. The FDA consumption estimates
allow for inventory changes at the early stages of the distribution
process, and the rather sketchy data on retail inventories do not
indicate much liquidation in either 1942 or 1943. Nor could a
higher degree of fabrication account for an accelerated upward
movement in consumers' expenditures. Military and lend-lease tak-
ings, heavily weighted with highly processed items, are
to explain the slightly greater employment in the processing indus-.
tries in 1942 and 1943.
The price adjusted totals for clothing could be checked with the
help of the Federal Reserve Board index of the output of clothing
and shoes for civilians; raw materials allocated to civilian output;
18Forthe basis of the Department's price adjustment, see 'Price Deflators for Con-
sumer Commodities and Capital Equipment, 1929-42', by Henry Shavell, Survey of
Current Business, May 1943, pp. 13-21; also Part H, note 6.68 PART II
military takings; and man hours of employment in apparel indus-
tries. The consensus of these data indicates an overstatement of
expenditures, when adjusted by current price indexes for clothing
and shoes, of roughly 15 per cent in 1942 and 26 per cent in 1943,
even after adjustment for discrepancies that might be attributed to
a reduction in inventories.'9
Both adjustments reflect probably not only a rise in prices but
also quality uptrading of a kind that occurs when incomes rise; and
the disparity between the Department of Commerce tdeflated' totals
and the physical volume we used may be due also to a possible over-
valuation of retail sales in the Department's estimates of the flow
of civilian foods and clothing in current prices. For these reasons
it cannot be claimed that for these two specific categories the im-
plicit price indexes constructed above measure the price rise more
accurately than the indexes used by the Department of Commerce
in calculating the totals.
But even if the adjustments overstate the rise in the prices of
food and clothing, we thought it best to include them fully. For
no other commodity and service group is account taken of the fail-
ure of currently available price indexes to reflect completely quality
deterioration, forced uptrading, and shifts of consumers to higher
priced localities. Any overadjustment for food and clothing would
probably be more than offset by the failure to adjust the tdeflated'
totals in all other categories of consumer goods (App. Table II 1).
From the annual indexes of final product prices of consumer
goods we estimated consumers' outlay. in 1939 prices annually. To
get the total flow of goods to individuals and households we added
$3.1 billion per year to allow for the value of direct governmental
services to individuals. The quarterly totals for 1939-41 are De-
partment of Commerce estimates. Those for 1942 and 1943 are
interpolations within our annual totals in 1939 prices (App. Table
111) on the basis of the quarterly totals in 1939 prices as estimated
by the Department of Commerce (App. Table II 2, col. 1 and 2).
b Resource input
For reasons discussed in the text, we need estimates of the flow of
consumer goods not only in 1939 final product prices but also in
19Becauseof the confidential classification of the underlying data, the detailed calcu-
lations cannot be shown here.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 69
terms of resource input at 1939 prices of resources. The simplest
way to get this series is to construct an index of the efficiency of
resource use in the production and distribution of consumer goods;
then apply an adjustment based upon this efficiency index directly
to the value of consumer goods in 1939 final product prices.
Except for scattered data on changes in physical output per man
hour for a few manufacturing and mining industries and utilities
(published chiefly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Productivity
and Technological Development Division), there is no information
on changes in the efficiency of resources used in the production of
consumer goods or in other nonwar categories. The few data sug-
gest that the annual gain in productivity since 1939 has been mod-
erate, not more than 2 or 3 per cent; that it virtually ceased by
1942; and that in recent quarters, as the scale of operations in many
APPENDIX TABLE 111
Flow of Goods to Consumers, 1939 Prices
Revised Estimates Compared with Department of Commerce Estimates
(dollar figures in billions; base year for 1939)
1942 1943
A CoMMoDITIEs
I Department of Commerce
1 Total, current prices 54.4 61.7
2 Total, 1939 prices 43.4 45.4
3 Implicit price index (1 2)100 125.3 135.9
II Our Estimates
4 Total, 1939 prices 41.2 41.8
5 Implicit price index (1 + 4)100 132.0 147.6
B SERVICES
1 Total, current prices 27.6 29.2
2 Total, 1939 prices 25.4 25.4
3 Implicit price index 108.7 115.0
C TOTAL (excl. direct government services to individuals)
I Department of Commerce
1 Total, current prices 82.0 91.0
2 Total, 1939 prices 68.8 70.8
3 Implicit price index 119.2 128.5
II Our Estimates
4 Total, 1939 prices 66.6 67.2
5 Implicit price index 123.1 135.4
Department of Commerce estimates in current and 1939 prices from Survey of Current
Business, April 1944, p. 8, Table 3, and p. 13, Table 10. Because of rounding, details
will not necessarily check.APPENDIX TABLE II 2
Flow of Goods to Consumers, Current and 1939 Prices, Quarterly, 1939-1943
(dollar figures in billions, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
RESOURCE
TOTAL TOTAL INPUT
YEAR & Current 1939 final EFFICIENCY ADJ.IN 1939
QUARTER prices product prices INDEX (2) prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1939 64.8 64.8 100.0 0.0 64.8
I 63.5 63.7 99.1 0.6 64.3
II 64.1 64.5 99.7 0.2 64.7
III 65.1 64.8 100.3 —0.2 64.6
IV 66.3 65.9 100.9 —0.6 65.3
1940 68.8 68.0 102.5 —1.6 66.4
I 67.7 67.1 101.5 —0.9 66.2
II 68.1 67.4 102.2 —1.4 66.0
III 69.0 68.2 102.8 —1.8 66.4
IV 70.3 69.3 103.4 —2.2 67.1
1941 77.7 72.7 104.8 —3.2 69.5
I 74.1 72.2 104.0 —2.7 69.5
II 76.8 73.0 104.6 —3.1 69.9
III 80.4 74.3 105.1 —3.5 70.8
IV 79.5 71.4 105.5 —3.6 67.8
2942 85.1 69.8 105.1 —3.2 66.6
I 83.4 71.1 105.3 —3.4 67.7
II 82.6 68.3 105.1 —3.2 65.1
III 85.9 69.7 105.0 —3.2 66.5
IV 88.5 70.1 105.0 —3.2 66.9
1943 94.1 70.3 105.0 —3.2 67.1
I 93.4 70.6 105.0 —3.2 67.4
II 92.5 69.1 105.0 —3.1 66.0
UI 94.2 70.6 105.0 —3.2 67.4
IV 96.1 71.2 105.0 —3.2 68.0
COLUMN
1 Sum of consumer goods and services (Survey ofCurrentBusiness, April 1944, p. 12,
Table 7, line 14, and p. 13, Table 10, line 16) and an allowance for direct personal
taxes of $3.1 billion per year—an average of direct personal taxes for 1936-38 (ibid.,
May1942, p. 12, Table 4, line 10).
2 Sum of estimates for (a) nondurable commodities; (b) durable commodities; (c)
services, excluding direct government services to individuals; (d) direct government
services. (a) for 1939-41 is from the Department of Commerce; for 1942 and 1943
annual totals of the Department of Commerce, modified by the adjustments for food
and clothing categories as described in the text and interpolated by quarters on the
basis of Department of Commerce quarterly estimates in 1939 prices. (b) and (c) are
from the Department of Commerce. (d)is assumed to be $3.1 billion per year
throughout the period.
3 Assumed, see text.
4 100(col. 2, excl. direct government services, divided by col. 3) —(cot.2, excl. direct
government services).
5 Cot. 2 plus adjustments in col. 4.
Because of rounding, details will not necessarily check.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 71
civilian industries shrank and dilution of labor and other resources
took place, efficiency per resource unit may have diminished.
The efficiency index in Appendix Table II 2, column 3, an un-
warrantedly precise quantitative summary, is intended to be illus-
trative rather than substantive. It rises mildly to 1942, then remains
stable through most of 1942 and all 1943. The adjustment it neces-
sitates is calculated for the flow of goods to consumers, excluding
direct governmental services (col. 4). The application of this ad-
justment to the total flow of goods to consumers in 1939 final
product prices (col. 2) yields an estimate of the resource input
equivalent of this flow in 1939 resource prices (col. 5). Because the
changes during the period in the efficiency index are so minor,
resource input and final product output move in substantially the
same way, except for the somewhat more moderate rise from 1939
to 1943 in the former.
2 NONWAR CAPITAL FORMATION
The quarterly and annual totals of nonwar gross capital formation
in current prices (App. Table II 3, col. 1) are the sum of corre-
sponding totals of private gross capital formation as estimated by
the Department of Commerce, and public nonwar construction—
the sum of appropriate categories of public construction in the de-
tailed estimates of the Department. The totals net of depreciation
and depletion (col. 2) are the difference between column 1 and
the estimated consumption of nohwar durable capital. The latter
is in turn the sum of depreciation and depletion on private durable
capital, as estimated by the Department of Commerce, and of an
allowance for the depreciation on public construction, set roughly
at $1 billion per year throughout the period.
For an adjustment of nonwar capital formation to 1939 final
product prices (cal. 3 and 4) we rely again on Department of
Commerce estimates. The main component of column 3, private
gross capital formation, in 1939 final product prices, is a Depart-
ment estimate. In this price adjustment the Department uses in-
dexes of construction costs, prices of capital equipment goods, prices
of commodities (in connection with inventory changes), and so
on. The meth9ds are briefly described in the Survey of Current
Business, March 1943 (notes to Table 1,pp.19-20). For the other
component of column 3, public nonwar construction, the values72 PART II
in current prices are adjusted for price changes by the Department
of Commerce index for its construction component of private gross
capital formation.
To pass from nonwar gross capital formation in 1939 final
product prices to net, we subtract from the former depreciation and
depletion valued at 1939 prices. To obtain this subtrahend, depreci-
ation and depletion in current prices was adjusted for price changes
by an index compiled from Department of Commerce data on the
construction and durable equipment components of private gross
capital formation.Since current price changes are presumably
damped in the total values of capital goods subject to depreciation
APPENDIX TABLE II 3
Nonwar Capital Formation, Current and 1939 Prices
Quarterly, 1939-1943
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
T 0 T A L S RESOURCE INPUT
1939 EINAL AD).POR 1939
YEAR & CURRENTPRICES PRODUCT PRICES TRANSITION TO RESOURCE PRICES
QUARTER Gross Net Gross NetRESOURCE PRICESGross Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1939 13.2 6.0 13.2 6.0 0.0 13.2 6.0
I 12.7 5.5 12.6 5.4 0.1 12.7 5.5
II 11.6 4.4 11.6 4.4 0.0 11.6 4.4
III 12.5 5.3 12.5 5.3 0.0 12.5 5.3
IV 16.1 8.8 16.1 8.8 —0.1 16.0 8.7
1940 16.7 9.3 16.5 9.1 —0.4 16.1 8.7
I 16.6 9.3 16.4 9.1 —0.2 16.2 8.9
II 14.8 7.4 14.7 7.3 —0.3 14.4 7.0
III 16.5 9.1 16.4 9.0 —0.4 16.0 8.6
IV 18.8 11.3 18.5 11.1 —0.6 17.9 10.5
1941 20.9 13.0 19.6 12.0 —0.9 18.7 11.1
I 19.3 11.7 18.6 11.1 —0.7 17.9 10.4
II 20.8 13.0 19.8 12.2 —0.9 18.9 11.3
III 21.4 13.4 19.9 12.2 —1.0 18.9 11.2
IV 22.2 14.0 20.0 12.2 —1.0 19.0 11.2
1942 8.8 0.1 7.6 —0.6 —0.4 7.2 —1.0
I 14.7 6.2 12.8 4.8 —0.6 12.2 4.2
II 11.8 3.1 10.1 1.9 —0.5 9.6 1.4
III 5.5 —3.4 4.8 —3.5 —0.2 4.6 —3.7
IV 3.1 —5.9 2.7 —5.7 —0.1 2.6 —5.8
1943 2.7 —6.5 2.2 —6.3 —0.1 2.1 —6.4
I 2.7 —6.3 2.2 —6.3 —0.1 2.1 —6.4
II 1.9 —7.1 1.6 —6.9 —0.1 1.5 —7.0
HI 3.4 —5.6 2.6 —5.9 —0.1 2.5 —6.0
IV 3.0 —6.0 2.2 —6.3 —0.1 2.1 —6.4NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 73
Notesto Appendix Table 11 3
COLUMN
1 Sum of private gross capital formation (Survey of Current Business, April 1944,
p. 12, Table 7, line 8, and p. 13, Table 10, line 8) and public nonwar construction,
defined as public excluding residential, military and naval, and nonresidential indus-
trial(for 1939-42: ibid., May 1943, p.10, Table 7; for 1943, by addition of
monthly entries: ibid., April 1944, p. S-4).
2 Col. 1 minus depreciation on both private capital (ibid., April 1944, p. 14, Table 13,
line 3, with minor changes to allow for a more gradual quarterly movement) and
public nonwar construction (roughly estimated to be $1 billion per year throughout
the period).
3 Sum of private gross capital formation in 1939 prices (Department of Commerce)
and public nonwar construction (estimates in current prices, from cot.1, adjusted
for price changes by the Department of Commerce index for its construction com-
ponent of private gross capital formation).
4 Cot. 3 minus depreciation and depletion, adjusted to 1939 prices by a price index
derived from the Department of Commerce quarterly data for the construction and
durable equipment components of private gross capital formation (in current and
1939 prices). One-half of the rise in the current prices of construction and equip.
ment was allowed in the index used to adjust the depreciation and depletion allow-
ance for price changes.
5 Based on the assumed efficiency index in App. Table II 2, col. 3. The adjustment is
equal to 100(col. 3 ÷ efficiency index) —col.3.
6 Col. 3 plus adjustments in col. 5.
7 Cot. 4 plus adjustments in col. 5.
Because of rounding, details will not necessarily check.
and depletion, only one-half of the rise in the current prices of con-
struction and equipment was included in the index. This procedure
is crude. But in view of the difficulties of a proper translation of
depreciation to a reproduction value base, the small annual change,
and the smallness of the item relative to total national product, it
did not seem worth while to attempt more laborious calculations.
Nonwar capital formation in 1939finalproduct prices is ad-
justed to resource input levels by the same efficiency index as con-
sumer goods in Appendix Table H 2. Lack of specific data is the
reason for this rather arbitrary procedure. The adjustment (App.
Table II 3, cot. 5) is then applied to gross capital formation in 1939
finalproduct prices (col. 3) to yield column 6. Net nonwar capital
formation in 1939 resource prices(col. 7)is the difference be-
tween gross (col. 6) and the depreciation and depletion in 1939
prices used to pass from column 3 to 4.74 PART II
3 WAR OUTPUT
a Resource input
For reasons indicated in the text, the first approach to the adjust-
ment of war output for price changes must be through the prices of
resources. Consequently, we must reverse the order of discussion
followed in the preceding two sections, and begin with resource
rather than final product prices.
The general scheme of estimating war output in 1939 prices is
indicated in Appendix Table II 4; some of the underlying data are
presented in Appendix Table II 5. Because data on the components
of war output are confidential, no figures are shown in Appendix
Table II 4.
APPENDIX TABLE II 4
Schematic Presentation of the Measurement of War Output in 1939 Prices
1939, 1940, First Half of 1941; then by Quarters
Mixed Final Product and Resource Prices
1 Total war output, current dollars
2 Nonniunitions (given directly)
3 Munitions & war construction (line 1 —line2)
4 Total costs, munitions & war construction
a) Labor (line 3 x line 5 of App. Table 115)
b) Capital & enterprise (line 3 x line 6 of App. Table 115)
c) Taxes (line 3 x line 7 of App. Table II 5)
5 Price index for labor costs (see text)
6 Price index for capital & enterprise (App. Table II5, line 10 after seasonal cor-
rection)
7 Resource input, 1939 prices
a) Labor (line 4aline5)
b) Capital & enterprise (line 4b —line6)
c) Taxes (1939 ratio of line 3 of App. Table II 5 to sum of lines 1 & 2 of App.
Table 115 multiplied by sum of lines 7a & b)
d) Total (lines 7a + b + c)
8 Price index for nonmunitions (see text)
9 Nonmunitions, 1939 prices (line 2 ÷ line 8)
10 War output, 1939 prices (lines 7d + 9)
Implicit Price Indexes
11 Taxes (line 4c ÷ line 7c)
12 Munitions & war construction (line 3 ± line 7d)
13 Total war output (line 1 ÷ line 10)
An approximate division of war output into nonmunitions, munitions, and war con-
struction has recently been published in Budget Message of the President; Washington,
1944 (see table on p. vi). The apportionment used in the calculations here is from the
monthly estimates of the War Production Board.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 75
The adjustment of war output for price changes is carried through
separately for two components: (aa) nonmunitions; (bb) muni-
;tions and war construction. The former, adjusted by final product
prices, and the latter by resource price indexes, together yield (cc)
.a mixed price index of war output (App. Table II 4). Only by
further adjustment of the nonmunitions sector (as well as by allow-
.ance for depreciation on war construction) do we get (dd) gross
.and net war output, in 1939 resource prices.
aa Nonmunitions
•These comprise military pay; civilian pay (war agencies) ; subsistence;
travel; agricultural exports; other nonmunitions. Apart from pay
items, the group is made up largely of consumer type goods, though
subject to considerable modification to satisfy military requirements.
Indeed, many of the items are purchased off the shelf rather than
•contracted for. As their close correspondence with civilian type
products seems to warrant the application of wholesale price in,-
•dexes, appropriate ones were chosen from the BLS wholesale price
series. Both military and civilian pay were corrected for recent in-
creases in rates of pay.
The index of final product prices for the nonmunitions segment
of total war output rises to about 110 by the last quarter of 1941;
averages somewhat over 125 in 1942; and rises further to about
145 in 1943.
bb Munitions and war construction
The conversion to 1939 resource prices was effected by the separate
deflation of the main components of munitions output in current
prices: labor costs and gross profits, the latter in turn divided be-
tween returns to capital and enterprise and corporate income and
excess profits taxes. The weights assigned these three components
of munitions output are determined by the division of gross output
in the five industrial groups (oil, gas and metal mining, chemicals
and petroleum refining, metal fabrication, and contract construction)
that accounted for the bulk of munitions output and war construc-
tion in 1942 and 1943 (see App. Table II 5).
i)The price index for the labor factor was based on changes in
hourly earnings in war manufacturing industries. A weighted index
was constructed by dividing aggregate weekly wages actually paid
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outthe period (the nu.rnber of employees multiplied by the average
work week, in hours; the product, i.e., weekly man hours, then
multiplied by average hourly earnings, in 1939)ina group of 44
war industries (BLS employment and earnings series). This gave,
in effect, an index of hourly earnings in these 44 industries com-
bined, weighted by current man hours.2°
The 44 metal, chemical, and rubber industries covered (BLS
designations and arranged in ascending order of the percentage in-
crease in average hourly earnings from 1939to1942)follow:
1.Communications equipment 22 Silverware & plated ware
2 Rubber tires & inner tubes 23 Smelting & refining, nonferrous metals
3 Blast furnaces, steel works & rolling24 Electrical equipment
mills 25 Hardware
4 Tractors 26 Rubber goods, other
5 Stoves, oil burners & heating 27 Agricultural machinery, excl.tractors
equipment 28 Stamped & enameled ware &
6 Plumbers' supplies . galvanizing
7 Wirework 29 Aircraft & parts, cxci. aircraft
8 Automobiles engines
9 Textile machinery 30 Steam & hot-water heating apparatus
10 Machine-tool accessories & steam fittings
11 Washing machines, wringers & 31 Cutlery & edge tools
dryers, domestic 32 Clocks & watches
12 Lighting equipment 33 Tools, exci. edge tools, machine tools:
13 Chemicals files & saws
14 Sewing machines, domestic & 34 Aluminum
industrial 35 Car building, electric & steam railroad
15 Explosives & safety fuses 36 Radios & phonographs
16 Fabricated structural & ornamental 37 Forgings, iron & steel
metal work 38 Alloying & rolling & drawing
17 Typewriters 39 Ammunition, small arms
18 Cash registers, adding & calculating 40 Shipbuilding
machines 41 Engines & turbines
19 Machinery & machine-shop products 42 Pumps and pumping equipment
20 Machine tools 43 Locomotives
21 Bolts, nuts, washers, rivets 44 Aircraft engines
ii)The current cost of the capital plus enterprise factor is the
sum of corporate net income after taxes, depreciation, entrepreneurial
income, interest, and net rents and royalties. To construct a price
20 Weighting had almost no effect. The weighted and the unweighted indexes almost
kept pace during 1939-42; the high wage industries had a slight tendency to expand
less rapidly than the relatively low wage industries.
The weighted index was used through the second quarter of 1943. For the re-
maining two quarters of that year it was extrapolated by the unweighted index for
the 44 industries.78 PART II
index for this component, changing total cost had to be divided by
the changing number of units of capital and enterprise. Since it is
difficult to find an index of changes in the input of capital and en-
terprise analogous to man hours of employment, we used the in-
dex of the consumption of raw materials of mineral origin prepared
at the National Bureau by G. H. Moore.2' It may reflect with a fair
degree of accuracy the utilization of durable capital in war indus-
tries—by and large, the biggest metal consumers in both war and
peace; but it is quite unrelated to the enterprise or risk element of
gross capital or to such elements of management as are not included
in labor income. The net increase in the unit return to capital and
enterprise, only slightly greater than in the unit return to labor,
is not believed to be excessively large and may conceal a sizable
downward bias.
iii)Corporate income and excess profits taxes have increased
enormously since 1939, especially in the industries that have been
largely converted to war production. But the increase reflects the
needs of the government for more revenue in wartime rather than
additional services performed for corporate enterprises. It can of
course be argued that under wartime controls of production and dis-
tribution the government has assumed most of the risk and many











Lead jsecondary Portland cement shipments
Tin consumption Gypsum
Magnesium Graphite
Antimony consumption Sand & gravel
Mercury consumption Crushed limestone
Sulphur
Experiments with an index of somewhat different composition more closely related
to the 5war' industries (excluding coal and including rubber, ethyl alcohol, lumber)
yielded a similar index. Recalculation did not, therefore, seem warranted.
A seasonal correction had to be introduced into the price index since it reflects
the seasonal influences of such elements in the capital and enterprise totals as dividends
and interest (see App. Table II 5, line 10).NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 79
of the management functions of corporations, particularly of those
manufacturing military equipment. But to the extent that this is
true, the increase in the real contribution of capital and enterprise
is certainly overstated in our estimates; and any allowance for an
increase in the real value of services measured by taxes would be
offset by a reduction in the real value of the services of capital and
enterprise. We have assumed that in 1939 corporate taxes were
the monetary equivalent of the federal government's contribution
to business activity; and that thereafter such services kept pace with
real output, i.e., with deflated labor and capital costs. As a result of
applying this assumption, corporate taxes have an implicit price
index of about 700 in 1942 and 800 in 1943; and contribute ma-
terially to the rise in the implicit price index for total war outlay in
those years.
cc The mixed price index
The combination of the final product price index for nonmunitions
and of the resource price indexes for munitions and war construc-
tion yielded an annual mixed price index of war output for 1939-41
and quarterly indexes beginning with the third quarter of 1941
(App. Table II 6, col. 3). Detailed quarterly calculations did not
seem warranted for the period before the third quarter of 1941,
partly because prices had changed so little since 1939, but mainly be-
cause the war output totals were so small. From 1939 to the third
quarter of 1941 quarterly price indexes were, therefore, constructed
by graphic interpolation of the annual figures (App. Table II 6,
col. 4).
dd War output, in terms of resource input,
at current and 1939 prices
To make the results obtained so far usable in calculating gross and
net war output at the resource input level, two further steps are
necessary: to estimate (i) nonmunitions at resource rather than
final product prices, (ii) depreciation on war construction, so that
all totals for war output can be adjusted to a net basis.
i)First we translate the nonmunitions component of gross war
output (col. 3, identical with col. 6 of App. Table II 6) to resource
input at 1939 resource prices. Again we have recourse to the effi-
ciency index used for consumer goods, though the procedure is
probably even more arbitrary here. Nevertheless, for the part of80 PART II
nonmunitions output for which an efficiency index can have a mean-
ing (food, and similar civilian type products, as distinct, e.g., from
APPENDIX TABLE II 6
Derivation of Quarterly Gross War Output and Price Index
Mixed Final Products and Resource Prices
1939 to 1941, Second Quarter
(dollar figures in billions)
GROSS WAR OUTPUT IMPLICIT PRICE INDEX (1939 =100) GROSS
YEAR &Current 1939 Annual & InterpolatedFinal WAR OUTPUT
QUARTERprices prices quarterly values series 1939 prices
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





1940 2.8 2.5 112 112 2.5
I .4 103 103 .4
1! .5 108 108 .5
In .6 110 110 .5
1V 1.2 115 115 1.0
1941 12.8 10.0 128 128 10.0
I 1.9 120 120 1.6
II 2.5 124 124 2.0
III 3.5 2.7 128 128 2.7
IV 4.9 3.7 132 132 3.7
1942 50.3 34.8 144 144 34.8
1 7.2 5.4 133 133 5.4
II 10.8 7.7 140 140 7.7
III 14.8 10.1 147 147 10.1
IV 17.6 11.6 152 152 11.6
2943 81.3 50.9 160 160 50.9
1 18.9 12.2 154 154 12.2
H 20.7 13.1 159 159 13.1
III 20.6 12.8 161 161 12.8
IV 21.0 12.8 164 164 12.8
COLUMN
1 Survey of Current Business, April 1944, p. 13, Table 10, line 4.
2 By application, to col. 1 of annual and quarterly price indexes in App. Table II 4.
3 (Col, 1 ÷ cot. 2)100.
4 Interpolated graphically on the basis of annual figures. There was no need to in-
terpolate quarterly for 1939 since the indicated quarterly indexes were not sufficiently
above or below 100 to affect the values in current prices in the first decimal place.
5 Combination of col. 3 and 4.
6 Col. 2 when given; for all other periods (col. 1 ÷ cot 5)100.
Because of rounding, details will not necessarily check.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 81
the services of the armed forces), the efficiency index in Appendix
Table II 2 is perhaps the most reasonable approximation that can be
made. Its application yields the adjustment in column 5 of Appendix
Table II 7; which, in turn permits us to compute gross war output,
in terms of resource input at 1939 prices (col. 6).
ii)Depreciation on war construction in current prices is cal-
culated by applying a ratio, based upon an assumed 10-year life
and a straight line apportionment, to the cumulated quarterly vol-
ume of war construction (cumulated beginning with the first quar-
ter of 1939). Subtraction from column 1 of Appendix Table II 7
yields net war output in current prices (col. 2).
We adjusted the quarterly totals of depreciation on war con-
struction for price changes by the index of construction costs and
prices of durable equipment used by the Department of Commerce
for the construction and equipment components of private gross
'capital formation. It undoubtedly understates the level of current
costs of war construction relative to 1939, but may approximate
fairly well the changing valuation level in the cumulated total of
-war construction subject to depreciation. In any event, in view of
the crude assumptions that have to be made concerning the scope
of this category and the life period underlying the depreciation
rate, more laborious and specific procedures for price adjustment
not seem warranted.
Net war output in 1939 mixed resource and product prices is the
difference between column 3 of Appendix Table II 7 and the quar-
terly estimates of depreciation on war construction in 1939 prices;
in 1939 resource prices it is the difference between column 6 and
the latter.
b In final product prices
To convert war output to 1939 final product prices, three assump-
tions were made concerning the relative efficiency of resources in
munitions and war construction (see Sec. 3c). Appendix Table II
8 shows a sample calculation based on assumption a. The quarterly
index in column 1 is by graphic interpolation to annual totals, which
allows for a two-thirds rise of the index from 1939 to the first half
of 1943, some retardation in the rise from the third quarter of 1941
to the second quarter of 1942; then a more rapid rise, which loses
momentum in the second half of 1943.82 PART It
APPENDIX TABLE II 7
War Output, Resource Input at Current and 1939 Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
T 0 T A L S ADI. OF RESOURCE tNPUT
YEAR & CURRENTPRICES1939 MIXED PRICES NONMUNITIONS TO 1939 RESOURCE PRICES.
QUARTERGross Net Gross Net 1939 REsOURCE PRICES Gross Net
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1939 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
I 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
II 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 No 1.3 1.3
III 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
IV 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 adj. 1.5 1.5
1940 2.8 2.8 2.5 2.5 through 2.5 2.5
I 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.7
II 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1940 1.9 1.9
III 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.4 23
IV 4.8 4.7 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.1
1941 12.8 12.5 10.0 9.7 —0.1 9.9 9.6
1 7.7 7.5 6.4 6.2 —0.1 6.3 6.1
II 10.0 9.7 8.1 7.8 —0.1 8,0 7.7
III 13.9 13.6 10.9 10.6 —0.2 10.7 10.4
IV 19.7 19.3 14.9 14.5 —0.2 14.7 14.3
1942 50.3 49.5 34.8 34.0 —0.5 34.3 33.5
I28.7 28.1 21.6 21.1 —0.3 21.3 20.8
II43.2 42.5 30.9 30.3 —0.4 30.5 29.9
III 59.1 58.2 40.2 39.4 —0.6 39.6 38.8
IV 70.3 69.1463 45.2 45.6 44.5
194381.3 79.5 50.9 49.3 —0.7 50.2 48.6
I75.6 74.1 49.1 47.8 —0.7 48.4 47.1
II82.9 81.2 52.1 50.6 —0.7 51.4 49.9
HI82.6 80.7 51.3 49.6 —0.7 50.6 48.9
IV 84.0 82.0 51.2 49.4 —0.7 50.5 48.7
COLUMN
1 Survey of Current Business, April 1944, p. 12, Table 7, line 4, and p. 13, Table 10,
line 4.
2 Col. 1 minus depreciation on war Construction, calculated by applying a 10 per cent
charge, a fairly crude approximation, to the total of government-financed war con.
struction—the sum of the public construction items listed in Appendix Table II 3,
note tocol.1,as excluded because they represent war construction—cumulated
quarterly. Only one-half of the given quarter's construction is included in the cumu-
lated total for that quarter. The quarterly depreciation series is then one-tenth of the
quarterly war construction total.
3 From col. 1, by applying the price index in col. 5 of App. Table II 6.
4 Col. 3 minus depreciation on war construction (for values in current prices see note
to cot. 2) adjusted for price changes by the index of construction costs and prices
of durable equipment (obtained by dividing the Department of Commerce quarterly
totals for the construction and equipment components of gross capital formation in
current prices by those in 1939 prices).NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 83
Theweights of the indexes in columns 1 and 2, based on the
approximate proportions of the two components of war output (in
1939 prices in App. Table II 7), are held constant, since otherwise
the proportion of nonmunitions in total war output could be cal-
culated. But in general, variations in the proportions are relatively
minor in quarterly totals in recent years.
The implicit prices in column 7 are final product prices reflecting
the assumed relative efficiency of resources in munitions and war
construction. Appendix Table II 9 presents the more important steps
in the calculations based upon assumptions b and c. In accordance
with the decision to vary the three assumptions only with respect
to the level of relative efficiency set for the first half of 1943, and
to make them the same with respect to the relative movement of
the efficiency level from 1939 to 1943, the quarterly interpolation
of the efficiency indexes, as well as the movement of the annual
totals, was established along lines similar to those adopted in the
calculations based upon assumption a.
Under the three assumptions, the implicit final product prices for
munitions and war construction (and hence for war output) could
not be relatives of actual prices in terms of 1939 as 100 unless we
disregarded differences in the level of efficiency of resource use in
war production relative to that in similar industries in peacetime.
What are the temporal changes in final product prices of war output,
if the level of relative efficiency is disregarded, and what would
the totals of war output and national product be if adjusted for such
price changes over time alone?
Appendix Table II 10 provides the key price index, calculated
from averages of the annual price indexes in war output implicit
under the three assumptions in terms of 1939 as 100. This annual
index is interpolated quarterly, largely again on the basis of the
Notes to Appendix Table II 7 concluded:
COLUMN
5 Based on the assumed efficiency index (see App. Table II 2, col. 3) applied to the
nonmunitions part of war output in 1939 prices. To prevent disclosure of the
amounts, the nonmunitions component was here calculated as 0.3 of the total war out-
put in col. 3. Thus the entries in col. 5 are equal to 100 [(col. 3 x 0.3) ÷ efficiency
index) —(col.3 x 0.3).
6 Col. 3 plus adjustments in col. 5.
7 Col. 4 plus adjustments in col. 5.
Because of rounding, details wilt not necessarily check.84 PARTII
implicit quarterly price indexes under the three assumptions of
Appendix Tables II 8 and 9, smoothed to eliminate erratic fluctua-
tions. Column 5 in Appendix Table 1110 is a matter of straight-
APPENDIX TABLE II 8
Sample Calculation of Gross War Output, 1939 Final Product Prices
Quarterly, 1939-1943
Assumption a
(dollar figures in billions, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
RELATIVE
EFFICIENCY OF RESOURCES GROSS WAR OUTPUT
MunitionsNon. 1939 1939 final IMPLICIT
YEAR && war con-rnuni- Corn- resourceproduct pricesCurreot P1UCB INDBX
QUARTERstruccion tions bined prices prices
(6) (7)
1939 48 100 61 1.4 0.8 1.35 165
I. 48 99 61 1.2 0.7
II 48 100 61 1.3 0.8
III 48 100 61 1.4 0.9
IV 49 101 62 1.5 0.9
1940 51 102 64 2.5 1.6 2.8 175
I 50 101 63 1.7 1.1
H 51 102 64 1.9 1.2
III 51 103 64 2.4 1.5
IV 52 103 65 4.2 2.7
1941 56 105 68.5 9.9 6.9 12.9 187
I 54 104 66.5 6.3 4.2
II ss 105 67.5 8.0 5.4
III 57 105 69 10.7 7.4
IV 59 106 71 14.7 10.4
1942 67 105 76.5 34.3 26.5 50.3 189
I 61 105 72 21.3 15.3
II 64 105 74 30.5 22.6
III 69 105 78 39.6 30.9
IV 74 105 82 45.6 37.4
1943 83 105 89 50.2 44.6 81.3 182
I 78 105 85 48.4 41.1
II 82 105 88 51.4 45.2
III 85 105 90 50.6 45.5
IV 88 105 92 50.5 46.5
COLUMN
1 & 2 Assumed, see text. Annual entries are averages of quarterly.
3(Col. 1 x 0.75) + (col. 2 x 0.25). Annual entries are averages of quarterly.
4 App. Table II 7, col. 6.
5 Annual entries are averages of quarterly.
6 App. Table II 7, ccl. 1.
7 Underlying calculation in col. 5 carried to two decimal places.
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forwardcalculation from column 4 and estimates of gross war
output in current prices (App. Table II 7, col. 1).
4SUMMARYTABLES
Now that we have discussed the measurement of the three major
components of national product (wartime concept) —flow of goods
APPENDIX TABLE II 9
Gross War Output, 1939 Final Product Prices, Quarterly, 1939-1943
Assumptions b and c
(dollarfigures in billions, seasonally adjtisted annual rates)
ASSUMPTION b ASSUMPTIONC
RelativeGross war RelativeGross war
efficiencyoutput, Price efficiency output, Price
of resources1939 final index of resources1939 final index
YEAR & in war productimplicit in war productimplicit
QUARTERproductionprices in (2) production prices in (5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1939 72 1.0 138 84 1.1 119
I 72 0.9 83 1.0
JJ 72 0.9 83.5 1.1
III 72 1.0 83.5 1.2
IV 73 1.1 84.5 1.3
1940 76 1.9 144 89 2.3 123
I 74 1.3 86 1.5
II 75 1.4 88 1.7
III 76 1.8 89.5 2.2
IV 77.5 3.3 91 3.8
1941 82 8.2 156 96 9.6 133
I 79 5.0 93 5.9
II 81 6.5 95 7.6
III 82.5 8.8 97.5 10.4
IV 85 12.5 100 14.7
1942 92 31.9 158 109 37.8 133
I 87 18.5 103 21.9
II 89 27.1 106 32.3
III 94 37.2 111 44.0
IV 98 44.7 116 52.9
1943 109 54.8 148 129 64.8 126
I 103 49.8 121.5 58.8
II 107 55.0 127 65.3
III 111 56.2 131 66.3
IV 115 58.1 136 68.7
See notes to Appendix Table II 8.
Col. 1 and 4 correspond to col. 3 of Appendix Table II 8; col. 2 and 5 to col. 5 of
Appendix Table II 8; col. 3 and 6 to col. 7 of Appendix Table II 8.86 PARTII
to consumers, nonwar capital formation, and war output—and pre-
sented the estimates for each, we are in a position to assemble sum-
mary tables covering both these components and the national
product totals (App. Tables II 11-14). The entries in these four
summary tables are either transcribed from the appendix tables
APPENDIX TABLE II 10
Gross War Output, Adjusted by an Implicit Final Product Price Index
for Munitions and War Construction
IMPLICIT ANNUAL PRICE INDEX, GROSS WAR
1939=100 Ày. OUTPUT
YEAR & UNDER ASSUMPTION IMPLICIT(8 billions, 1939
QUARTER a b c INDEX product prices)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)


























1 App. Table II 8, col. 7.
2 App. Table II 9, col. 3.
3 Ibid., col. 6.
4 Average of col. 1-3 in terms of 1939 as 100 interpolated graphically on the basis of
quarterly figures for col. 1-3.
5 iOO(col. I of App. Table II 7 ÷ cot. 4).NATIONAL PRODUCT, 19394943 87
alreadypresented and discussed, or are the sum of the estimates
for the components. The one minor point that calls for comment is
the calculation of net war output in final product prices (App.
Table II14, col. 3-6): as the difference between the entries in
the corresponding columns for gross (App. Table II 13, col. 3-6)
and depreciation on war construction, as already calculated in Ap-
pendix Table II 7 (war output in resource prices). We could re-
calculate this depreciation item in terms of final output represented
by war construction, by basing it on a share of war output, as
shown in App. Table 1113. But it is not clear that the results would
APPENDIX TABLE II 11
National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept
Quarterly, 1939-1943, Current Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
FLOW OF NON WAR NATIONAL PRODUCT
YEAR & GOODSTO CAPITAL FORMATION WAR OUTPUT Gross Net
QUARTERCONSUMERS Gross Net Gross Net (1+2+4) (1±3±5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1939 64.8 13.2 6.0 1.4 1.4 79.4 72,2
I 63.5 12.7 5.5 1.2 1,2 77.4 70.2
II 64.1 11.6 4.4 1.3 1.3 77.0 69.8
III 65.1 12.5 5.3 1.4 1.4 79.0 71.8
IV 66.3 16.1 8.8 1.5 1.5 83.9 76.6
1940 68.8 16.7 9.3 2.8 2.8 88.3 80.9
I 67.7 16.6 9.3 1.7 1.7 86.0 78.7
II 68.1 14.8 7.4 2.0 2.0 84.9 77.5
III 69.0 16.5 9.1 2.6 2.5 88.1 80.6
IV 70.3 18.8 11.3 4.8 4.7 93.9 86.3
194.1 77.7 20.9 13.0 12.8 12.5 111.4 103.2
I 74.1 19.3 11.7 7.7 7.5 101.1 93.3
II 76.8 20.8 13.0 10.0 9.7 107.6 99.5
III 80.4 21.4 13.4 13.9 13.6 115.7 107.4
IV 79.5 22.2 14.0 19.7 19.3 121.4 112.8
1942 85.1 8.8 0.1 50.3 49.5 144.2 134.7
1 83.4 14.7 6.2 28.7 28.1 126.8 117.7
II 82.6 11.8 3.1 43.2 42.5 137.6 128.2
III 85.9 5.5—3.4 59.1 58.2 150j 140.7
IV 88.5 3.1—5.9 70.3 69.1 161.9 151.7
1943 94.1 2.7—6.5 81.3 79.5 178.1 167.1
I 93.4 2.7—6.3 75.6 74.1 171.7 161.2
II 92.5 1.9—7.1 82.9 81.2 177.3 166.6
III 94.2 3.4—5.6 82.6 80.7 180.2 169.3
IV 96.1 3.0—6.0 84.0 82.0 183.1 172.1
Column 1: App. Table II 2, col. 1; 2: App. Table II 3, col. 1; 3: ibid., ccl. 2; 4:App.
Table II 7, col. 1; 5: ibid., col. 2.88 PART II
be better approximations than the estimates in Appendix Table II
7; and in view of the smallness of the item and the necessarily
arbitrary character of the underlying assumption concerning length
of life, the refinement in consistency did not seem to warrant the
additional calculations.
APPENDIX TABLE II 12
National Product and Its Components in Terms of Resource Input
Wartime Concept, Quarterly, 1939-1943, 1939 Resource Prices
(billionsof dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
FLOW OP NON WAR TOTAL RESOURCE INPUT
YEAR & GOODSTO CAPITAL FORMATION WAR ourptrr Gross Net
QUARTERCONSUMERS Gross Net Gross Net (1+2+4) (1+3+5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1939 64.8 13.2 6.0 1.4 1.4 79.4 72.2
I 64.3 12.7 5.5 1.2 1.2 78.2 71.0
H 64.7 11.6 4.4 1.3 1.3 77.6 70.4
III 64.6 12.5 1.4 1.4 78.5 71.3
IV 65.3 16.0 8.7 1.5 1.5 82.8 75.5
1940 66.4 16.1 8.7 2.5 2.5 85.0 77.6
1 66.2 16.2 8.9 1.7 1.7 84.1 76.8
11 66.0 14.4 7.0 1.9 1.9 82.3 74.9
111 66.4 16.0 8.6 2.4 2.3 84.8 77.3
IV 67.1 17.9 10.5 4.2 4.1 89.2 81.7
1941 69.5 18.7 11.1 9.9 9.6 98.1 90.2
I 69.5 17.9 10.4 6.3 6.1 93.7 86.0
II 69.9 18.9 11.3 8.0 7.7 96.8 88.9
III 70.8 18.9 11.2 10.7 10.4 100.4 92.4
IV 67.8 19.0 11.2 14.7 14.3 101.5 93.3
1942 66.6 7.2—1.0 34.3 33.5 108.1 99.1
1 67.7 12.2 4.2 21.3 20.8 101.2 92.7
II 65.1 9.6 1.4 30.5 29.9 105.2 96.4
HI 66.5 4.6—3.7 39.6 38.8 110.7 101.6
IV 66.9 2.6—5.8 45.6 44.5 115.1 105.6
1943 67.1 2.1—6.4 50.2 48.6 119.4 109.3
I 67.4 2.1—6.4 48.4 47.1 117.9 108.1
II 66.0 1.5—7.0 51.4 49.9 118,9 108.9
III 67.4 2.5—6.0 50.6 48.9 120.5 110.3
IV 68.0 2.1—6.4 50.5 48.7 120.6 110.3
Column 1: App. Table II 2, cot. 5; 2: App. Table H 3, col. 6; 3: ibid.,col.7; 4: App.
Table II 7, col. 6; 5: ibid.,col.7.NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1939-1943 89
APPENDIXTABLE II 13
Gross National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept
Quarterly, 1939-1943, 1939 Final Product Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
GROSS WAR OUTPUT GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
GROSS Disre- Disregarding
FLOW NON WAR levelof
OF GOODS CAPITAL Under level of tinderassumption reLative
YEAR& TOCON- FORMA- assumption relative a b c efficiency
QUARTER S(JMERS lION a b cefficiency(1+2+3) (1+2+4) (1+2+5) (1+2+6)
(1) (2) (3)(4)(5)(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1939 64.8 13.2 0.81.0 1.11.4 78.8 79.0 79.1 79.4
1 63.7 12.6 0.70.91.01.2 77.0 77.2 77.3 77.5
11 64.5 11.6 0.80.9 1.1 1.3 76.9 77.0 77.2 77.4
III 64.8 12.5 0.9 1.01.2 1.4 78.2 78.3 78.5 78.7
IV 65.9 16.1 0.91.11.3 1.5 82.9 83.1 83.3 83.5
1940 68.0 16.5 1.61.92.32.7 86.1 86.4 86.8 87.2
1 67.1 16.4 1.1 1.31.5 1.7 84.6 84.8 85.0 85.2
II 67.4 14.7 1.2 1.41.7 1.9 83.3 83.5 83.8 84.0
III 68.2 16.4 1.5 1.82.22.5 86.1 86.4 86.8 87.1
IV 69.3 18.5 2.73.33.84.4 90.5 91.1 91.6 92.2
1942 72.7 19.6 6.98.29.611.3 99.2 100.5 101.9 103.6
I 72.2 18,6 4.25.05.96.9 95.0 95.8 96.7 97.7
II 73.0 19.8 5.46.57.68.8 98.2 99.3100.4101.6
III 74.3 19.9 7.48.810.412.2 101.6 103.0 104.6106.4
IV 71.4 20.0 10.412.514.717.1 101.8 103.9 106.1 108.5
1942 69.8 7.6 26.531.937.844.1 103.9 109.3 115.2 121.5
I 71.1 12.8 15.318.521.925.0 99.2 102.4 105.8 108.9
11 68.3 10.1 22.627.132.337.6 101.0 105.5 110.7116.0
III 69.7 4.8 30.937.244.052.3 105.4 111.7 118.5 126.8
IV 70.1 2.7 37.444.752.962.8 110.2 117.5 125.7135.6
1943 70.3 2.2 44.654.864.875.3 117.1 127.3 137.3 147.8
I 70.6 2.2 41.149.858.868.7 113.9122.6131.6 141.5
II 69.1 1.6 45.255.065.376.8 115.9 125.7 136.0 147.5
III 70.6 2.6 45.556.266.377.2 118.7 129.4 139.5 150.4
IV 71.2 2.2 46.558.168.779.2 119.9 131.5 142.1 152.6
COLUMN COLUMN
1 App. Table II 2, col. 2. 4 App. Table II 9, col. 2.
2App. Table 113, col. 3. 5 Ibid., col.5.
3 App. Table II 8, col. 5. 6 App. Table 1110, col.90 PART II
APPENDIX TABLE II 14
Net National Product and Its Components, Wartime Concept
Quarterly, 1939-1943, 1939 Final Product Prices
(billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted annual rates)
NET WAR OUTPUT NET NAflONAL PRODUCT
NET Di sre-
PLOW NONWAR garding levelof
OFGOODS CAPITAL Under level of Under assumption relative
YEAR & TOCON- FORMA- assumption relative a b c efficiency
QUARTER SUMERS TION a b ceffidency(1+2+3) (1+2+4) (1+2+5) (1+2+6)
(1) (2) (3)(4)(5)(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
1939 64.8 6.0 0.81.01.11.4 71.6 71.8 71.9 72.2
1 63.7 5.4 0.70.91.01.2 69.8 70.0 70.1 70.3
II 64.5 4.4 0.80.9 1.11.3 69.7 69.8 70.0 70.2
III 64.8 5.3 0.91.01.21.4 71.0 71.1 71.3 71.5
IV 65.9 8.8 0.91.1 1.31.5 75.6 75.8 76.0 76.2
1940 68.0 9.1 1.61.92.32.7 78.7 79.0 79.4 79.8
I 67.1 9.1 1.11.31.51.7 77.3 77.5 77.7 77.9
II 67.4 7.3 1.21.41.71.9 75.9 76.1 76.4 76.6
111 68.2 9.0 1.41.72.12.4 78.6 78.9 79.3 79.6
IV 69.3 11.1 2.63.23.74.3 83.0 83.6 84.1 84.7
1941 72.7 12.0 6.67.99.311.0 91.3 92.6 94.0 95.7
1 72.2 11.1 4.04.85.76.7 87.3 88.1 89.0 90.0
II 73.0 12.2 5.16.27.38.5 90.3 91.4 92.5 93.7
11! 74.3 12.2 7.18.510.111.9 93.6 95.0 96.6 98.4
IV 71.4 12.2 10.012.114.316.7 93.6 95.7 97.9100.3
1942 69.8 —0.6 25.731.137.043.3 94.9100.3106.2112.5
1 71.1 4.8 14.818.021.424.5 90.7 93.9 97.3 100.4
II 68.3 1.9 22.026.531.737.0 92.2 96.7101.9 107.2
111 69.7 —3.5 30.136.443.251.5 96.3 102.6 109.4 117.7
IV 70.1 —5.7 36.343.651.861.7 100.7 108.0116.2 126.1
1943 70.3 —6.3 43.053.263.273.7 107.0 117.2 127.2 137.7
1 70.6 —6.3 39.848.557.567.4 104.1 112.8 121.8 131.7
II 69.1 —6.9 43.753.563.875.3 105.9115.7126.0 137.5
III 70.6 —5.9 43.854.564.675.5 108.5 119.2 129.3 140.2
IV 71.2 —6.3 44.756.366.977.4 109.6121.2 131.8 142.3
COLUMN COLUMN
1 App. Table II 2, col. 2. 4 App. Table 11 13, col. 4 minus the differencc
2 App. Table 113, col. 4. between cot. 4 and 5 of App. Table II 12.
3 App. Table II 13, col. 3 minus the differencó5 App. Table II 13, col.5 minus the
between coi. 4 and 5 of App. Table 1112. between col. 4 and 5 of App. Table 1112.
6 App. Table 11 13, cot. 6 minus the differenc
between cot. 4 and 5 of App. Table II 12.